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ARTICLE
TRAVELERS, REASONED TEXTUALISM,
AND THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE
OF ERISA PREEMPTION
Edward A. Zelinsky*

INTRODUCTION
Upon the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")/ few would have predicted that, a
generation later, ERISA's provisions preempting state law would
be front page news,^ a central topic of national debate about health
care and its regulation. Similarly, few foresaw at the time ERISA
was adopted that the United States Supreme Court would have
great difficulty construing ERISA's preemption provisions. By the
same token, in 1974 the contemporary revival of interest in
statutory textualism lay well into the future.
In 1999, in contrast, the relationship among HMOs, state law,
and ERISA preemption is a major (and controversial) concern in
efforts to craft national health care legislation; indeed, the 106th
Congress has devoted considerable attention to the states' legal
ability vel non to regulate managed care providers and to provide
tort remedies against them. The Supreme Court, in three recent
decisions, has, without acknowledging it, largely abandoned its
prior approach to ERISA section 514, the provision of ERISA
which explicitly preempts state law. Many commentators suggest
• Edward A. Zelinsky is a professor of law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
of Yeshiva University. He is grateful for comments received on earlier drafts of this
article from Professors John H. Langbein, Jerry Mashaw, Norman Stein, and Lawrence
Zelenak, and from Alvin D. Lurie, Esq.
1 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
2 See Lizette Alvarez, Eye on Polling, G.O.P. Unveils a Patients' Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 1998, at Al; Robert Pear, Hands Tied, Judges Rue Law That Limits H.M.O.
Liability, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1998, at Al; Robert Pear, H.M.O. Group Backs Controls
G.O.P. Rejects, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1998, at Al; Robin Toner, Levered Issue, Second
Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,1999, § 4, at 1; see also, Jonathan Cohn, Cosmetic Surgery,
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 17/Aug. 24,1998, at 25 (cover story); Michael M. Weinstein, Getting
Litigious With H.M.O.'s, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,1998, § 4, at 5.
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that the failure of the Court's jurisprudence of ERISA preemption
is a case of textualism gone awryf most welcome the Court's
recent decisions as an appropriate, indeed overdue, revision of the
Court's approach to section 514.
Central to these controversies is the Court's decision in Shaw
V. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,' in which the Court announced a capacious
understanding of ERISA preemption, an understanding which
makes preemption of state law nearly automatic in the context of
employer pension and welfare plans. The critics have not been
kind to Shaw, suggesting that it constitutes an exemplar of overly
mechanistic, dictionary-based textualism.
The Court's new
jurisprudence of ERISA preemption, announced in New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co.,' places the Court, implicitly and in part, with the
critics of Shaw.
I depart from the conventional critique of Shaw and of the
Court's original formulation of ERISA preemption insofar as that
critique suggests that the Court should formulate its ERISA
preemption case law with little (perhaps no) regard for the terms
of the statute. To the contrary, I argue that ERISA preemption be
approached from a vantage which can best be labeled "reasoned
textualism." This approach is "textualist" because it emphasizes
the statute as the primary source of law and defines its task as
making the statute as workable as possible.® This approach is
"reasoned" as it eschews a mechanical, dictionary-based
textualism (properly disparaged by the critics of Shaw) and instead
3 See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme
Court, 3O'ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 324 (1998) (criticizing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85 (1983), as an "easy, dictionary-driven, plain meaning disposition of the term ... [which]
produced a flood of litigation for the lower federal courts"); Catherine L. Fisk, The Last
Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of
Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 39 (1996) ("If ever there were a case study of the
failures of textualism as a method of statutory interpretation, this is it."); Peter D.
Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed Care Torts: Achkying
Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35 ROUS. L. REV. 985, 990 (1998) (criticizing
the Supreme Court for "a mechanical approach [to ERISA preemption] that adheres to a
strict 'plain language' interpretation without questioning whether the result of these
interpretations can be reconciled with congressional intent").
t 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
5 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
^ This textualist vantage differs both from policy-driven approaches, under which the
courts fashion doctrine to achieve desired outcomes with minimal (if any) regard for the
statutory terminology, and intent-based methodologies, which purport to discern the
subjective intent of those who enacted ERISA. In the context of ERISA preemption,
these two alternatives have more in common than first appears; and, in practice, niay
amount to the same methodology, given the difficulty of finding intent in a statute like
ERISA, a complex jumble of compromises and policies. See infra notes 201-07 and
accompanying text.
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views statutory interpretation as a constrained process of judgment
and reflection. TTie underlying premise of such reasoned
textualism is that, in an area like the federal regulation of
employee benefit plans, an area of many and imperfect policy
judgments. Congress is the principal policymaker, a policymaker
which, however imprecisely and inelegantly, speaks through
statutes.
Approaching ERISA preemption through the motif of
reasoned textualism, the most compelling understanding of
ERISA section 514 is that it commands greater than usual
preemption scrutiny but that, by itself, section 514 does not answer
the preemption inquiry. Section 514 should thus not be read as the
typical express preemption clause, but should be imderstood as a
canon of construction which creates a presumption for preemption
in contrast to the normal predisposition against preemption;
consequently, section 514 is not to be read alone but must be
viewed in the context of the rest of ERISA.
On the subjects where ERISA affirmatively legislates, e.g.,
the administration of employee benefit plans, the fiduciary
standards governing such plans, the substantive rules for pension
plans, this approach raises the normal questions for implied
preemption—Is there conflict between state law and ERISA?
Does ERISA fully occupy the field to the exclusion of state law?—
but reads section 514(a) as establishing a rebuttable presumption
for preemption.
On the employee benefit subjects where ERISA does not
legislate, i.e., as to the content of welfare plans, this approach
construes section 514(a) as establishing a zone of employer
autonomy, free of state and federal regulation. This zone is
defined by analogizing from the topics which ERISA legislates as
to pensions but not welfare arrangements.
The reasoned textualist approach requires judicial judgments,
some close and difficult; nevertheless, under this approach the
statute shapes the inquiry and molds the outcomes since a
predisposition to find preemption (while less expansive than the
capacious test of the S/zow-based case law) defines the import of
the statute more broadly, leading to more conflict between state
and federal law, greater field occupation, and, ultimately, more
preemption than under normal preemption standards. This
reasoned textualist approach suggests skepticism of Travelers since
a searching reading of section 514 indicates that (contra Travelers)
that section is more than a codification of the Court's normal
implied preemption standards. On the other hand, my approach
suggests a narrower range of ERISA preemption than does Shaw
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and, in particular, suggests that, under ERISA as it now exists,
states can regulate HMOs and similar managed care providers and
furnish tort remedies against them even when such providers are
engaged by ERISA plans.
I advance my analysis in five steps. Part I of this Article
reviews the explicit statutory basis for ERISA preemption, section
514, and discusses the three stage inquiry mandated by that
section. Part II then explores the Court's initial case law based
upon the capacious interpretation of section 514(a) announced in
Shaw and follows that case law chronologically through the end of
the Shaw line. District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board
of TradeJ Part III of this Article discusses the Court's new
jurisprudence of ERISA preemption announced in Travelers?
While the Court has so far declined to acknowledge the extent to
which Travelers departs from the Shaw framework. Travelers
replaces the expansive Shaw approach of near automatic
preemption with the Court's traditional presumption against the
displacement of state law, while simultaneously subjecting certain
areas, previously litigated tmder the Shaw framework, to more
stringent (though undefined) preemption. This third section
argues that Travelers, while implicitly acknowledging the problems
of the Shaw approach, is itself flawed. The Travelers framework
gives inadequate substance to the terminology of section 514 which
commands something more than the Court's normal preemption
doctrine with its predisposition against preemption; moreover, the
Travelers formula is an ambiguous and unconvincing method of
preserving prior case law while simultaneously repudiating the
Shaw approach on which that case law is based.
Part IV of this Article outlines the reasoned textualist
approach and applies it to the Shaw and Travelers case law; in
many cases, the reasoned textualist approach preserves the Shawbased case law better than does Travelers-, indeed, this approach
provides a more convincing explanation for the results in Travelers
than does Travelers itself; when the reasoned textualist vantage
produces different results than Shaw, that difference is for the
better.
In particular. Part IV addresses the questions which have
recently occupied the attention of the courts, commentators, and
Congress: Does ERISA section 514 preempt state law tort actions
for medical malpractice and similar injury? Can the states,
consistent with ERISA, regulate HMOs and similar health care
providers? I conclude that section 514 does not preempt state law
' 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
8 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
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tort actions against service providers hired by employer-sponsored
plans though it does preempt when the plan itself furnishes
services. I similarly conclude that the states can, consistent with
ERISA, regulate HMOs and other health care providers even
when they furnish services to employer plans. These conclusions
emerge from a more searching analysis of the relevant statutory
text, suggesting that the problem to date has not been a surfeit of
textualism in the context of ERISA preemption, but an incomplete
engagement with the statute.
Moreover, this analysis suggests that the proposed DingellNorwood modifications to section 514, passed by the House of
Representatives' and intended to narrow the scope of ERISA
preemption vis-a-vis HMOs and other managed care providers,
may, in the context of the reasoned textualist approach, be
superfluous. Indeed, in some instances, Dingell-Norwood's
preemption provisions, if enacted into law, would paradoxically
reduce the tort liabilities of HMOs and other managed care
entities in comparison with their liabilities under the reasoned
textualist interpretation of section 514.
Part V places my analysis in several contexts. Among my
other assessments, I conclude that, while a reasoned textualist
approach can make section 514 more workable. Congress should,
as a matter of policy, repeal section 514, thus permitting ERISA
preemption to be governed by the Court's normal standards of
implied preemption.
I. THE STATUTE
As has been widely noted,^" ERISA governs two types of
employer-provided fringe benefit plans, but treats them
dissimilarly. ERISA covers both employer-provided deferred
compensation arrangements, denoted in the statute as pension
plans,^^ and employer-provided health, disability, and similar

' The Dingell-Norwood legislation, entitled the "Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care
Improvement Act of 1999," constitutes sections 1001-1601 of House Bill 2990, passed by
the House in the first session of the 106th Congress. See H.R. 2990, 106th Cong. § 1302
(1999) (modifying ERISA preemption).
See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 79 (2d ed. 1995).
" See ERISA § 3(2)(A), 88 Stat. 829, 833 (1974). ERISA consists of two types of
provisions, tax provisions governing qualified plans as part of the Internal Revenue Code
and labor provisions codified as part of the federal labor statutes. Sometimes, these
provisions overlap, indeed, are identical. In this Article, I follow convention by
referencing ERISA's labor sections to their original (uncodified) designation in ERISA
itself while referencing ERISA's tax provisions to their current Internal Revenue Code
designations.
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programs, denoted as welfare plans.^^ In some areas, ERISA
subjects both kinds of plans to the same statutory provisions. In
particular, ERISA mandates for both pension and welfare plans
the same obligations to report to the government and to plan
participants,^^ identical fiduciary responsibilities for those
managing plans and plan assets,^"* and the same judicial and
administrative remedies for such plans and those interested in
them.^' However, ERISA subjects pension arrangements, but not
welfare plans, to elaborate statutory provisions governing the
substantive content of such deferred compensation schemes."
These rules govern, inter alia, who must participate in pension
plans and when, the rates at which benefits and contributions must
accrue and vest, the nondiscriminatory nature of benefits and
contributions, and a variety of features about plan distributions.
In contrast, ERISA does not regulate the substance of welfare
plans. Viewed more affirmatively," ERISA provides, as to the
substance of welfare arrangements, for employer autonomy."
At the end of the legislative process finalizing the bills which
became ERISA, the Conference Committee added section 514
which provides that, as to pension and welfare plans covered by
ERISA," ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any" such plans.^" Excepted
from this preemptive rule are state insurance, banking, and
securities laws,^^ as well as states' "generally applicable criminal
law[s]."^^ However, the states may not deem ERISA-covered
plans to be insurance companies, subject to state insurance

12 See id. § 3(1), at 833.
13 See id. §§ 101-111, at 840-52.
" See id. §§ 401-414, at 874-90.
13 See id. §§ 501-515, at 891-97.
16 See id. §§ 201-308, at 852-74.
1' Most commentators criticize ERISA's failure to regulate the substance of welfare
arrangements. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 3, at 37 ("ERISA preemption has created an
enormous, unanticipated 'regulatory vacuum.'"); Troy Paredes, Note, Stop-Loss
Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining The Scope of Federal Preemption, 34
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 243 (1997) (criticizing "ERISA's regulatory void with respect to
welfare plans").
1^ In the case of collectively-bargained welfare plans, ERISA's policy of nonregulation is more appropriately characterized as employer/union autonomy since the
substance of such plans is determined through labor/management negotiations. The term
"employer autonomy," as I use it throughout this Article, should be imderstood as
including such employer/union autonomy.
1' Among the plans not subject to ERISA are most governmental and church plans.
See ERISA § 4(b), 88 Stat. 829, 839-40 (1974).
20 Id. § 514(a), at 897.
21 See id. § 514(b)(2)(A), at 897.
22 Id. § 514(b)(4), at 897.
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regulation?^
Thus, as a statutory matter, section 514 requires an analysis
which can involve as many as three steps. In the face of the
contention that ERISA preempts a state law, the first step under
section 514 is to determine whether the particular state law
"relate[s] to" ERISA plans?" if not, the ERISA preemption
inquiry under section 514 ends and the state law survives scrutiny
under section 514.^^ If, on the other hand, the state law in question
"relate[s] to" ERISA arrangements, that law is preempted unless
it falls within one of the four protected categories.^® Thus, the
second step under section 514 is to decide if the challenged state
law, while relating to ERISA plans, is protected by one of these
statutory categories; if the state law falls outside all of the
protected categories, the statutory inquiry ends with the state law
preempted per section 514; if, however, the state law falls within
one of the protected categories other than insurance law, the
section 514 inquiry ends with the law protected from section
514(a)'s mandate to preempt.^^ If the state law is shielded from
ERISA preemption by virtue of the law's status as an insurance
provision, the third and final step under section 514's "deemer
clause" is to determine whether the statute affects only genuine
insurance companies; if so, the state regulation survives ERISA
preemption under section 514;^ if, in contrast, the state insurance
rule reaches ERISA plans only by deeming such plans to be
insurance companies, the protection for state insurance laws
evaporates and the state law is preempted under section 514.
While some have labeled section 514 an accommodation of
fairly narrow interests,^' a chief sponsor of ERISA, in language
subsequently much-quoted,^" hailed section 514 as ERISA's
"crowning achievement,"^" freeing interstate employers from
conflicting state regulation.
" See id. § 514(b)(2)(B), at 897.
2"' See id. (preempting state laws that "may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan").
However, a state law, while immune from preemption under section 514, might still
be preempted under the Court's normal implied preemption doctrine. See infra notes 5155 and accompanying text.
2' The four protected categories are banking, securities, insurance, and general
criminal laws. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
2' Note, again, that the state law, while immune from preemption under section 514,
might still be preempted under the Court's normal rules of implied preemption. See infra
notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
2® Again, the state law, while not stricken per section 514, may be preempted under the
Court's normal preemption doctrine. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
2' See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 10, at 418-23.
2" See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 17, at 272-73.
31 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent).
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One possible approach^^ to section 514 is to understand it as
codifying the Court's existing preemption doctrine. Ultimately,
however, that characterization of section 514 is unconvincing. To
those embracing traditional legislative history, the comments with
which section 514 was unveiled to the House and Senate are strong
evidence that those who crafted section 514 thought they were
doing more than merely codifying the Court's preemption
doctrine, doctrine which the Court would have applied even if
there had been no section 514.
Even to those more skeptical of such history, it is hard, as a
textual matter, to view section 514 as incorporating the Court's
prevailing preemption standards when, without section 514, the
Court would have applied those standards anyway. Moreover, if
section 514(a) merely codifies the Court's normal preemption
rules, it is difficult to explain the provisions of section 514 which
exempt from ERISA preemption state insurance, banking,
securities, and criminal laws. If section 514(a) merely embodies
normal preemption standards, these exemptions are, from a
textual perspective, most plausibly read as reducing the level of
preemption in these earmarked areas below such normal
standards. Ironically, under this reading, section 514 becomes an
anti-preemption provision, its only practical effect to exempt state
insurance, banking, securities, and criminal laws from normal
preemption scrutiny.
Indeed, these exemptions represent a critical textual feature^^
of the statute, as section 514's protection for state banking,
securities, insurance, and criminal laws indicates that there is
something from which such laws are being protected. That, in
turn, implies that section 514(a) must embody more than the
Court's usual preemption standards. Thus, the more compelling
construction of the text is that ERISA's drafters provided for
greater than normal preemption in section 514(a), but protected
the specified categories of state laws from this increased scrutiny,
relegating them to normal preemption standards.
Finally, from a textual perspective, it is instructive to compare
Justices Scalia and Stevens have been most outspoken in urging this approach. The
Court's new case law under Travelers largely, but incompletely, adopts this approach,
embracing the normal presumption against preemption but nevertheless preserving prior
case law inconsistent with that presumption. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying
text.
33 As is discussed infra note 118 and accompanying text, another major textual feature
of section 514 is that it provides a single standard for all non-exempted state laws, i.e.,
"any and all" such state laws are preempted. ERISA § 514(a), 88 Stat. 829, 897 (1974).
Nevertheless, Travelers establishes a two-tiered scheme of preemption scrutiny, even
though there is no basis for such a scheme in the statute.
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the narrower preemption provisions in the bills passed by the
House and Senate with section 514 as it emerged from the
Conference Committee and ultimately became law.^'* Since these
rejected texts come much closer to embodying normal preemption
principles, it is hard to read the broader language of section 514(a)
as doing the same.
II.

Shaw AND ITS PROGENY; NEAR AUTOMATIC PREEMPTION

The Court's initiaP' approach to section 514(a) was
formulated in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.^'' In Shaw, New York
law mandated pregnancy-based disability payments for employees
when federal law did not.^^ In a statement which articulated the
essence of the Court's original jurisprudence of ERISA
preemption, the Court declared that it had:
[N]o difficulty in concluding that the [New York] Human
Rights Law and Disability Benefits Law "relate to" employee
benefit plans. The breadth of § 514(a)'s pre-emptive reach is
apparent from that section's language. A law "relates to" an
employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it
has a connection with or reference to such a plan. Employing
this definition, the Human Rights Law, which prohibits
employers from structuring their employee benefit plans in a
manner that discriminates on the basis of pregnancy, and the
Disability Benefits Law, which requires employers to pay
employees specific benefits, clearly "relate to" benefit plans.
We must give effect to this plain language unless there is good
reason to believe Congress intended the language to have some

See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 n.l9 (1982).
35 Decisions prior to Shaw had mentioned section 514(a), and one of them, Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981), had reached the merits. However, Alessi
avoided the more difficult issues lurking in section 514. In Alessi, injured employees
challenged provisions in their employers' pension plans which integrated, i.e., reduced,
pension benefits by the amount of workers' compensation payments received by these
employees. A New Jersey statute explicitly outlawed this practice. The Court held the
New Jersey law preempted imder section 514 and thus sustained the integration formulas
of the employers' plans and the consequent reduction of pension benefits to offset
workers' compensation payments. See id. at 526.
Much of the Alessi Court's analysis is compatible with traditional preemption
doctrine, although the Court did not characterize it as such. ERISA specifically permits
the integration of pension benefits with social security payments; the Treasury regulations
implementing ERISA extend the scope of permitted integration to reductions for other
kinds of payments such as workers' compensation. Even without section 514, the Court
could plausibly have viewed federal regulation as occupying the field and as conflicting so
clearly with the New Jersey statute as to preempt it. Instead, the Court found the New
Jersey statute "relate[d] to" ERISA-covered pension plans and therefore superseded. Id.
36 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
3' See id. at 89.
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more restrictive meaning.^®
In what became an equally important statement (albeit tucked
away in a footnote), the Court indicated that, in particular settings,
there would indeed be good reason for restricting the literal
application of the "relate to" language: some state laws might
"affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral a manner to warrant" preemption.^'
In retrospect, the problems of the Shaw framework seem selfevident: on the one hand, the Shaw Court declared the "relate to"
standard an easily applied and expansive term without discernible
limits, i.e., if a state law "has a connection with" an ERISAcovered plan, section 514(a) applies. Under this understanding of
the statute, ERISA preemption is nearly automatic whenever
section 514 is invoked.
On the other hand, the Court
acknowledged that there must be some boundaries to the reach of
ERISA preemption. Presumably, a plan trustee double parked for
a meeting with his fellow trustees cannot defend against a traffic
ticket on the ground that he was engaged in the business of an
ERISA-regulated plan.
Even acknowledging the inherent
imprecision of inquiries of this sort, the Shaw approach to section
514(a) provides little (if any) useful guidance as to where ERISA
preemption ends.
However, my instinct is to be more charitable in assessing
retrospectively the handiwork of the Shaw Court; hindsight, as
they say, is always 20/20. Moreover, in 1983 few could have
prophesied the factors which would later make the Shaw test so
unsatisfactory: the explosive growth of employer-provided medical
outlays, the consequent rise of managed care, the determination of
the states to regulate such care. In addition, the outcome in Shaw
was reasonably benign; for years subsequent to those at issue in
Shaw, federal law had outlawed pregnancy-based discrimination
prospectively; thus, declaring New York law preempted in
practical terms had only retroactive effect for prior years.""
Finally, the Shaw Court may have been led astray by the
usually helpful distinction between express and implied
preemption."^ When a federal statute explicitly provides for
preemption, that preemption provision is typically a reasonably
self-contained expression of policy, minimizing, if not eliminating,
the need for extensive analysis of the rest of the statute to see if
Id. at 96-97 (footnotes omitted).
39 /d.atl00n.21.
"0 See id. at 89-90.
''3 See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State
Tort Remedies, 11 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1997).
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the statute conflicts with state law or occupies the field to the
exclusion of state law."^ In contrast, implicit preemption, by
definition, depends upon such an analysis of the statute to discern
conflict or preemptive occupation of the field. As I suggest below,
the most workable reading of section 514 is as something of a
hybrid, using elements of both approaches, placing section 514(a)
alongside the relevant provisions of the statute and treating that
section as a canon of construction which creates a presumption for
preemption.
However, the Shaw Court plausibly, if ultimately mistakenly,
approached section 514(a) as a typical explicit preemption
provision, more or less capable of application independently from
the rest of ERISA and the implied preemption inquiries of conflict
and field preemption.
The Court's next ERISA preemption case. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,^^ reaffirmed the Shaw test which
the Court used to conclude that a Massachusetts insurance law
mandating mental health coverage in group insurance contracts
relates to welfare plans for purposes of section 514(a). The
Massachusetts statute, the Court decided, had "a connection with
or reference to" employers' health plans, "indirectly but
substantially," since the statute required such plans "to purchase
the mental-health benefits specified in the statute when they
purchase a certain kind of common insurance policy.'""* In the
second step of its analysis, the Court found the Massachusetts law,
while related to ERISA plans, nevertheless saved from
preemption as an exempted insurance statute.
For purposes of the present discussion, two aspects of
Metropolitan Life are noteworthy. First, only after determining
that the Massachusetts statute relates to welfare plans for purposes
of section 514(a) did the Court employ the normal presumption
"that Congress did not intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state
regulation.'"*^ Thus, the Court utilized the presumption against
preemption not in applying section 514(a) and the relate-to
standard, but only in the second stage of the section 514 inquiry,
when the Court turned to the insurance exemption from ERISA
preemption. This approach contrasts markedly with the Court's
new jurisprudence of ERISA which deploys the presumption
Compare ERISA § 514(a), 88 Stat. 829, 897 (1974), with the explicit preemption
provision of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
("USERRA"). See USERRA § 4302,108 Stat. 3150 (1994).
« 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
Id. at 739 (citations omitted).
« Id. at 740.
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against preemption at the first step of the analysis, i.e., when
determining whether a state law relates to ERISA plans for
purposes of section 514(a).
Second, the Court found that the Massachusetts statute
related to employer health plans by "indirectly but substantially'"*®
affecting employers' choices in the marketplace: under the
Massachusetts statute, an employer is forced either to self-fund its
employees' health benefits or to purchase insurance providing
mandated mental health benefits; as a result of the state statute,
the employer is deprived of the option of insuring health benefits
for its employees sans mental health coverage. The Court's new
jurisprudence, in contrast, dismisses such constrictions of employer
choices as indirect and, as such, not triggering section 514(a).'*^
Many have criticized Metropolitan Life for the dichotomy
between insured plans (indirectly subject to state supervision via
the states' regulation of insurance policies) and self-funded plans
(free of state regulation by virtue of ERISA preemption).'*®
However, the Court's response to this criticism was (and remains)
sound: the distinction between insured and noninsured plans is not
of the Court's making, but is in the statute, namely, section 514's
exemption for state laws regulating insurance.
The more serious problem with Metropolitan Life is that it
solidified the Court's commitment to the Shaw understanding of
the relate-to test; because of section 514's exemption for state
insurance laws, the Massachusetts statute (while relating to
ERISA-covered plans) was ultimately saved from preemption
since it is an insurance law."' It is, however, interesting to
speculate whether, in the absence of the insurance exemption, the
Metropolitan Life Comt would have perceived the Shaw approach
as going too far. Suppose, for example, that there were no
insurance exception in section 514 and that the Court had in
Metropolitan Life stricken the Massachusetts statute mandating
mental health benefits as that law applied to ERISA plans. How
far would the Court have been willing to apply this (hypothetical)
Metropolitan Life opinion? If, for example, an ERISA-covered
health plan of a Massachusetts employer desired to purchase
insurance from a carrier unlicensed to do business in
Massachusetts, would section 514 have preempted Massachusetts
from forbidding a relationship between the unlicensed insurer and
Id. at 739.
See discussion of Travelers infra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 10, at 444-45.
Section 514's exception for state insurance laws raises its own interpretative issues.
See UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 119 S. Ct. 1380 (1999).
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the ERISA plan? The only doctrinal tool in the Shaw toolkit to
avoid this outcome would have been to characterize
Massachusetts's prohibition on unlicensed insurers as "remote,"
"tenuous," or "peripheral" to ERISA plans,'" not a terribly
convincing notion when state law simply forbids a plan from
contracting with a desired service provider because the provider is
unlicensed.
Perhaps, confronted with these possibilities, the Court would
have recoiled in Metropolitan Life, as it later did in Travelers,
seeing that Shaw's capacious approach of near automatic
preemption could lead to undesirable places. However, section
514's exemption for state insurance laws precluded the Court from
having to face these possibilities; the Shaw standard thus looked
manageable since, in the final analysis, the Massachusetts statute
was sustained.
In contrast, in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,^^ the Shaw
formula had a more pronounced impact, i.e., the denial to the
aggrieved participant of his state law remedies. Moreover,
Dedeaux was the first decision in which the Court found implied
preemptive force in an ERISA provision other than section 514.
Dedeaux was insured under an employer-provided group disability
policy. After Dedeaux was injured, the carrier and Dedeaux
disagreed about his eligibility for benefits. Dedeaux then sued the
carrier pursuant to several tort theories available under Mississippi
law.
Relying again on the Shaw formulation of the relate-to test,
the Court found that Dedeaux's state law tort claims had "a
connection with or reference to" his employer's ERISA-covered
plan providing disability benefits on an insured basis.'^ Since these
claims did not constitute insurance regulation within the meaning
of section 514, they were preempted as relating to an ERISA plan
of employer-provided welfare benefits.
In retrospect, Dedeaux was a lost opportunity to examine the
relationship between section 514(a) and the rest of ERISA. As a
result, Dedeaux was also a turning point (not fully appreciated at
the time) in expanding the impact of ERISA preemption from
employer plans to the service providers engaged by those plans. In
Dedeaux, the Solicitor General, appearing amicus curiae, urged
the Court to hold section 502, EMSA's claims provision, the
exclusive set of remedies against ERISA plans." The Court
Shaw V. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,100 n.21 (1983).
51 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
52 Id. at 47 (citations omitted).
53 See id. at 52.
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agreed, declaring that "the detailed provisions of § 502(a) set forth
a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme" that had its own "pre
emptive force" vis-a-vis state law remedies.^"
This formulation raises a question which the Court did not
address: if section 502 (and, by extension, other provisions of
ERISA) on their own preempt conflicting state law, what is the
function of section 514?^' Or, to reframe the inquiry, if section
514(a) explicitly governs ERISA's preemptive effect, what role is
left for the Court's implicit preemption doctrine?
Moreover, Dedeaux involved an employee's lawsuit not
against his employer's medical plan, but against a service provider
hired by the plan, i.e., an insurance carrier. Under the expansive
Shaw approach to section 514(a), the distinction between lawsuits
against plans and actions against such service providers is of no
moment, since a claim against a service provider has "a connection
with" the plan and is, per Shaw, preempted. However, as I discuss
below,'® a careful reading of section 502, in the context of the
ERISA provisions touching upon service providers, highlights the
distinction between plans (subject to extensive ERISA regulation)
and the service providers engaged by plans (not subject to such
regulation). The distinction between plans and service providers
proves important when we turn to the current controversy about
ERISA preemption, the state tort law liability of service providers
like managed care organizations, and the states' legal ability to
regulate such organizations."
Section 514's relationship with the rest of ERISA, as well as
the capaciousness of the Shaw standard, are central to Mackey v.
Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.,^^ a case which, for the
first time in the ERISA preemption setting, divided the Court." In
Mackey, a collection agency sought to satisfy judgments by
garnisWg amounts owed to workers by a vacation pay plan, an
ERISA-covered welfare arrangement.®" A specific Georgia statute
prohibited the garnishment of welfare plan benefits; the Court
easily and unanimously foimd this statute preempted. The Court
had greater difficulty determining whether ERISA preempted
5" Id. at 54.
My answer starts with the xmcertainty of determining whether state and federal law
conflict or whether Congress has occupied the relevant field. Section 514(a) is best
understood as shaping the inquiry by creating a presumption for preemption in contrast to
the traditional presumption against preemption.
5' See discussion infra notes 178-87 and accompanying text.
5^ See infra notes 178-93 and accompanying text.
58 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
5' Until Mackey, the Court's preemption decisions had been unanimous.
«> See ERISA § 3(1), 88 Stat. 829, 833 (1974).
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Georgia's general garnishment statute insofar as judgment
creditors sought to use such statute to reach welfare plan benefits.
In Mackey, a five-Justice majority found against such
preemption. Critical to the majority's reasoning was the need for a
mechanism to enforce judgments against ERISA plans, if a plan
has liability under section 502 which it refuses to pay or if a plan
has liability from "run-of-the-mill state-law claims such as unpaid
rent, failure to pay creditors, or even torts committed by an
ERISA plan."®^ Since ERISA does not provide a device to enforce
judgments against recalcitrant plans, it is necessary in such cases to
utilize state law procedures such as Georgia's general garnishment
statute.
Of equal concern to the Court's majority was ERISA section
206(d), which specifically requires pension plans to contain
spendthrift clauses protecting pension benefits from aUenation and
assignment. To construe section 514(a) as accomplishing the same
protection for welfare arrangements (via the preemption of state
garnishment laws), would, the majority reasoned, render section
206(d) redundant.®
The four member minority viewed the majority's concern
about the enforcement of judgments against plans as irrelevant to
Mackey, since Mackey involved a garnishment order requiring a
welfare plan to retain the funds owed to a participant to satisfy the
participant's debt, not an order against the plan to collect money
owed by the plan on its own behalf. As to section 206(d), the
minority acknowledged the redundancy problem, but countered
that the majority (by upholding state garnishment laws as applied
to welfare programs) was rendering redundant section 514(b)(7).
That provision, adopted by Congress in 1984, saves from ERISA
preemption state law garnishments to enforce certain "qualified
domestic relations orders."® Unless section 514(a) generally
preempts state garnishment laws, the minority reasoned, it was
unnecessary for section 514(b)(7) to save such laws from
preemption in the context of qualified domestic relations orders.
Mackey and the division in the Mackey Court highlight the
problematic nature of the Shaw relate-to standard. In the final
analysis, neither the Mackey majority nor the minority relied on
section 514(a) or Shaw to resolve the case, but invoked other
Mackey, 486 U.S. at 833. Presumably, the torts being referred to are not the kinds of
tort claims which Dedeaux held preempted by sections 502 and 514.
As I note infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text, a different understanding is that
section 206(d) requires employers to include spendthrift clauses in pension plans; welfare
plans are free to include such clauses or not.
« 18 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7) (1994).
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provisions of ERISA—sections 206(d), 502, and 514(b)(7)—to
answer the preemption inquiry. But that approach begs a central
question under the statute: if the provisions of ERISA, by virtue of
their detailed and comprehensive nature, override state law as a
matter of implied preemption, what is the meaning of section 514
and its explicit preemption mandate?
A second notable aspect of Mackey is the majority's effort to
reformulate the outer boundary of ERISA preemption.
Eschewing the Shaw Court's formula of that boundary ("tenuous,
remote, or peripheral"),®" the Mackey Court denoted as "run-ofthe-mill"®® those state laws beyond the scope of section 514(a) and
its relate-to standard. This reformulation of the outer bounds of
ERISA preemption is ultimately no more helpful than the Shaw
test it supplements, suggesting the difficulties of finding limits
under Shaw's capacious understanding of the statute's "relate to"
terminology.
The Court's unanimity essentially reappeared in EMC Corp.
V. Holliday,^ when the Court held a Pennsylvania anti-subrogation
statute preempted as it would have applied to employers' selffunded medical plans. In EMC, an employee's child was injured in
an automobile accident; the employer's self-funded medical plan
paid a portion of the child's medical bills. The employee sued the
driver on his child's behalf and obtained a settlement. The plan
then sought reimbursement from the settlement proceeds pursuant
to a subrogation clause in the plan. The employee resisted, citing a
Pennsylvania statute outlawing subrogation as to motor vehicle
tort recoveries. The Court found the Pennsylvania statute
protecting such recoveries ERISA-preempted, thus permitting the
plan to enforce its subrogation provision and obtain
reimbursement for its outlay from the settlement proceeds.
The EMC Court began its analysis with the by-now familiar
Shaw test: the Pennsylvania anti-subrogation law related to an
employee benefit plan because it had "a connection with or
reference to such a plan."®^ The Court buttressed this conclusion
by noting the importance of ERISA preemption in establishing
national uniformity: if Pennsylvania's anti-subrogation policy
stood as to ERISA plans, an interstate employer would be
required to calculate benefit levels differently in Pennsylvania than
in other states permitting subrogation.®^
Shaw V. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,100 n.21 (1983).
« Mackey, 486 U.S. at 833.
498 U.S. 52 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 58 (citation omitted).
See id. at 60.
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The Court acknowledged that the Pennsylvania antisubrogation statute passed muster as an insurance law; however,
Pennsylvania cannot deem self-funded plans to be insurance
carriers. Hence, as to the self-funded EMC plan, ERISA
precluded Pennsylvania from applying its anti-subrogation statute.
In interpreting section 514 in this manner, the EMC Court
acknowledged "the presumption that Congress does not intend to
pre-empt areas of traditional state regulation."® Again, however,
the Court did not deploy this presumption at the first step in the
section 514 analysis, i.e., in determining whether the Pennsylvania
anti-subrogation statute relates to welfare plans, but only after that
inquiry was completed and the analysis moved to the second and
third steps of applying the insurance exemption and the deemer
clause.
In contrast. Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter in EMC, would
have used the presumption against preemption at the first stage of
the section 514 analysis and would have found, on that basis, that
the Pennsylvania statute did not relate to welfare plans within the
meaning of section 514(a)—a position close to that ultimately
adopted by the Court in Travelers.
At one level, the Court's next ERISA preemption decision,
Ingersoll-Rand
v.
McClendon^^
resembled its earlier
pronouncement in Dedeaux. Like Dedeaux, Ingersoll-Rand
involved a plan participant who sued in state court under a tort
theory. In Ingersoll-Rand, the participant was apparently'^ fired
months before vesting in his employer's qualified deferred
compensation plan. The participant claimed that he had been
terminated to prevent such vesting and that, as a matter of state
law, this termination constituted tortious conduct by the employer.
A divided Texas Supreme Court agreed, recognizing a state law
tort when employers fire employees to minimize employers'
pension costs.
The United States Supreme Court subsequently held the
Texas tort preempted, explicitly by section 514(a) and implicitly by
ERISA's remedy provisions. The Court easily and unanimously
found that the Texas tort relates to the employer's ERISAregulated pension plan since, under the Texas court's analysis.
Id. at 62.
™ See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). But this position is not identical since Travelers effectively
provides tougher scrutiny of certain state laws. See discussion infra notes 117-19 and
accompanying text.
•" 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
Neither the fired participant nor his former employer seems to have initially
recognized that the participant indeed did have sufficient service to vest.
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"there simply is no cause of action if there is no plan.'"^
Moreover, six of the nine Justices^" also held that ERISA's
remedy provisions preempt the Texas tort under principles of
implied "conflict pre-emption.'"' ERISA section 510 proscribes
pension-motivated firings; ERISA section 502 (also central to the
Court's analysis in Dedeaux) authorizes a federal cause of action
to enforce employees' ERISA rights. Together, the six Justices
concluded, these provisions provide the employee with his
exclusive remedy, by implication preempting any state law cause
of action.
Like Dedeaux, Ingersoll-Rand leaves unexamined the
relationship between section 514(a) and implied preemption
analysis: If provisions of ERISA other than section 514(a) displace
state law under the Court's traditional implied preemption
doctrine, what is the role of section 514(a) and its explicit
statement of ERISA preemption? If section 514(a) reaches
beyond that doctrine, striking state laws which would otherwise
survive the Court's regular approach to implicit preemption, it is
irrelevant that, absent section 514(a), ERISA would preempt some
state laws anyway.'' On the other hand, reading section 514(a) as
coterminous with the Court's standard implied preemption
analysis renders that section superfluous.
There is, moreover, a difference between Dedeaux and
Ingersoll-Rand which, while logically ignored under Shaw,
becomes critical under a more searching reading of the statute:
Dedeaux was an action against a service provider, in particular, the
insurer hired by the employer's medical plan; Ingersoll-Rand, in
contrast, was an action against an employer. If, per Shaw, the test
for preemption is whether a claim has "a connection with" an
ERISA plan, both kinds of actions are properly viewed as
preempted. If, however, the entire text of ERISA is considered,"
ERISA treats employers differently from service providers,
regulating extensively the former but not the latter. As I argue
below, it is consequently appropriate to read ERISA's remedies as
occupying the field as to employer misbehavior, but not as
occupying the field vis-a-vis service providers and their relations
with plan participants.
Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 140.
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens expressed no opinion on this subject.
Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 145.
This perspective buttresses the decision of the three Justices who joined IngersollRand to the extent it struck the Texas tort under section 514(a), but who did not join the
Court's discussion of traditional conflict preemption and sections 502 and 510, as, from
this perspective, the latter discussion was dicta.
'''' See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.

1999]

ERISA PREEMPTION

825

John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Harris Trust and
Savings BanE^ again explored the relationship among ERISA
preemption, the Court's regular preemption doctrine, and section
514's exception for state insurance laws. While the issues in John
Hancock were quite technical, at its core, the John Hancock
controversy was about the employer's ability to utilize funds an
insurance company held for the employer's qualified plan. If the
funds were characterized as normal insurance reserves, the
employer had to prove its entitlement to those funds under
contract, tort, or insurance law theories; on the other hand, if the
funds held by the insurer were properly classified as assets of the
employer's plan and if the insurer was also a fiduciary with respect
to these funds, the insurer's handling of these funds was subject to
the higher standards of ERISA's fiduciary rules which forbid selfinterested behavior by the insurer as fiduciary. This, in turn, made
it easier for the employer to reach these funds since it was simpler
for the employer to show self-interested behavior by the insurer
than for the employer to demonstrate the employer's entitlement
under contract, tort, or insurance law theories.
In holding that the funds held by the insurer were indeed plan
assets subject to ERISA's fiduciary standards, the Court, inter alia,
rejected the insurer's contention that section 514's preservation of
state insurance law effectively preempts federal law, awarding
state insurance regulation exclusive jurisdiction over funds held by
insurers, even for ERISA plans. In rejecting this approach, the
John Hancock Court first noted that "[sjtate laws concerning an
insurer's management of general account assets can 'relate to [an]
employee benefit plan' and thus fall under the preemption clause
[of section 514(a)], but they are also, in the words of the saving
clause, laws 'which regulat[e] insurance.'"^' Moreover, the saving
clause—section 514's exemption for state insurance laws—does
not, the Court held, "alter ... preemption analysis."®" Thus, state
insurance laws and federal laws affecting insurance co-exist with
federal law preempting when the two conflict.
As a construction of section 514, this analysis is compelling:
section 514(a) and its "relate to" standard provide for more
stringent preemption than does normal implied preemption
analysis with its presumption against the displacement of state law;
section 514's exemption provisions restore state insurance,
banking, securities, and criminal laws to these traditional
preemption standards, more solicitous of state law. This analysis
'8 510 U.S. 86 (1993).
" Id. at 99 (first and third alterations in original).
80 Id. at 87.
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also highlights the problem with the alternative view (subsequently
embraced by the Court in Travelers) that section 514(a) merely
embodies the conventional principles of implied preemption, in
particular, the traditional presumption against preemption. Under
that understanding of section 514(a), the exemption provisions are,
as a textual matter, most plausibly read as reducing the quantum
of federal preemption for the protected categories of state law
below traditional levels of implied preemption scrutiny, effectively
turning section 514 into an anti-preemption provision.
The last of the Court's Shaw-hased preemption cases®^ was
District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade,^^ in
which the Court struck on preemption grounds a District of
Columbia ("D.C.") statute which requires employers providing
health insurance to furnish the same insurance to injured
employees receiving workers' compensation. Labeling the Shaw
approach to section 514(a) as "true to the ordinary meaning of
'relate to,"'®^ the Court, summarizing the Shaw-hased case law,
declared that section 514(a) preempts state laws even if such laws
are "not specifically designed to affect"®" ERISA plans, even if the
effect of state laws on ERISA arrangements "is only indirect,"®'
and even if state laws are "consistent with ERISA's substantive
requirements."®® Since the D.C. statute "specifically refers to
welfare benefit plans regulated by ERISA,"®'' i.e., the employerprovided medical coverage which the statute extends to workers'
compensation recipients, the statute is preempted by section
514(a).
To summarize: Shaw and its progeny, through Washington
Board of Trade, understand section 514(a) capaciously. For the
first stage of ERISA preemption analysis—determining whether a
challenged state law "relates to" ERISA-covered plans—Shaw
mandates an inquiry far more expansive than the Court's normal
doctrine of implied preemption. While that implied preemption
doctrine employs a presumption against preempting state law,
Shaw goes well beyond a presumption in the opposite direction,
making preemption nearly automatic. Under Shaw, any reference
to or connection with an ERISA-regulated plan brings state law
This is my characterization; the Court itself, as I discuss infra notes 100-20 and
accompanying text, has been unwilling to acknowledge Travelers as commencing a new
line of cases and thus recognize Washington Board of Trade as ending an old one.
82 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
83 Id. at 129.
8'' Id. at 130 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,139 (1990)).
88 Id. (quoting Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 139).
8^ Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
82 Id.
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within the contours of section 514(a) and ERISA preemption.
Only at the second stage of analysis (pertaining to state insurance,
banking, securities, and criminal laws) does the Shaw case law
resort to traditional, i.e., deferential, preemption standards since
these laws are protected statutorily from the exacting scrutiny of
section 514(a).
The Court's Shaw-hased preemption case law does recognize
that there must be limits to the sweep of section 514(a); however,
the Court's efforts to define those limits ("remote," "peripheral,"
"tenuous," "run-of-the-mill")^® have not been successful.
If the particular outcomes reached under the Shaw rubric
were sometimes unpalatable for the Court, those results could
nevertheless be explained as implementing Congress's explicit
command to preempt state laws broadly when such laws relate to
ERISA-covered plans. That congressional command could, in
turn, be understood as mandating national uniformity and
employer autonomy for pension and welfare programs, plausible
policies albeit ones with their own costs.
It was, however, inevitable that a case would come before the
Court where a Shaw-based outcome would prove more troubling,
a case which would finally cast the Shaw framework as the
Godzilla of preemption, crushing everything in its path.
III.

AND THE NEW CASE LAW
OF ERISA PREEMPTION
The case which broke the Shaw framework was New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co.,®' which involved surcharges New York State
imposes as part of its regulation of hospital rates. Under New
York's regulatory scheme, hospitals charge patients covered by
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Medicaid, or an HMO only basic billing
rates for their hospital stays.'" Other patients, e.g., those covered
by commercial insurers, by self-insured funds, or by volunteer
firefighter benefits, pay to the hospital an additional thirteen
percent (13%) surcharge for their hospitalizations. Hospitalized
patients covered by commercial insurance also pay a second
surcharge of eleven percent (11%) which the hospital remits to the
state.'^
See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
89 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
90 These rates are based on 794 standard Diagnostic Related Groups. See id. at 649.
91 New York also levies a direct surcharge on HMOs based on their respective monthly
payments for members' hospital care; the amount of this surcharge varies with the HMOs'
Medicaid enrollment but can reach a maximum of nine percent (9%) of the HMOs'
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The obvious impact of these surcharges is to encourage
employers to switch from commercial insurance and self-funding
to Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage: a hospital bill of $200 for a
Blue Cross/Blue Shield patient is, by virtue of the surcharge
scheme, $226 for a patient participating in his employer's selffunded plan and $248 for a patient serviced by commercial
insurance.
Applying the Shaw-hased case law, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that section 514(a) preempts
this scheme of hospital surcharges;'^ indeed, under the Shaw
framework. Travelers is a straightforward case. In Metropolitan
Life, the Court, applying Shaw, held that the Massachusetts statute
mandating mental health coverage in insurance policies relates to
ERISA plans by constricting the choices confronting such plans:
the Massachusetts statute forces employers providing medical
benefits either to purchase insurance with mental health coverage
or to self-fund; the state law denies employers the option of
purchasing insurance without mental health benefits.'^ Thus, the
Massachusetts statute, per Shaw, relates to employers' ERISAcovered plans since the statute has a "connection with" such plans,
i.e., an "indirect[] but substantia^]""* influence on employers'
choices. The same is evidently true of the New York surcharge
scheme.''
In Metropolitan Life, the state law which triggered section
514(a) as relating to ERISA-covered plans ultimately avoided
preemption because, at the second stage of analysis, the law fell
within the protected category of insurance regulation. In contrast,
the New York hospital surcharges do not come within any of the
four exempted categories and thus, having triggered section
514(a), are preempted under the Shaw framework.
In the last case in the Shaw line, Washington Board of Trade,
outlays for its members' hospital care. See id. at 650.
'2 See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993).
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1984).
Id. at 739.
Arguably, employers' choices were more severely constricted in Metropolitan Life
than in Travelers since the Massachusetts statute in Metropolitan Life absolutely prohibits
insurance policies without mental health benefits; the New York surcharges, in contrast,
do not ban self-funding or commercial insurance coverage, but penalize via higher
effective hospital rates the employer's decision to self-fund medical coverage or to utilize
commercial insurance rather than Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage. It is, however,
difficult to discern in the Shaw approach a distinction between state laws which penalize
particular employer choices and state laws which ban certain choices; both kinds of laws
have a "connection with" employers' medical plans. Shaw defined the outer boundary of
ERISA preemption as state laws having only "tenuous," "remote," or "peripheral" impact
on ERlSA-regulated plans; a 24% cumulative surcharge on hospital rates is difficult to
characterize in such terms.
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the Court, quite accurately summarizing the evolution of the Shaw
relate-to test, reiterated that section 514 preempts state laws even
if such laws are "not specifically designed to affect'"® ERISA
plans, even if the effect of such laws on ERISA plans "is only
indirect,'"^ and even if such state laws are "consistent with
ERISA's substantive requirements.'"®
Given that broad
understanding of ERISA preemption as it had evolved under
Shaw, it is not surprising that the Second Circuit held that section
514(a) preempts New York's hospital surcharges."
As is evident from the Supreme Court's opinion in Travelers,
that conclusion was ultimately unacceptable to the Court.
However questionable some of the results under the Shaw line
might have been, the Court—until Travelers—viewed those results
as mandated by the literal terms of the statute and as justified by
reasonable policy rationales, principally, the need to free interstate
employers from inconsistent state regulation of such employers'
welfare plans.
However, applying Shaw to New York's hospital surcharges
would have effectively dismantled states' regulation of hospital
rates, indeed, would potentially have destroyed all state regulation
of medical care since roughly half of medical care in the United
States is purchased via employer-provided plans.Under the
capacious Shaw test of near automatic preemption, as originally
formulated in Shaw and as applied by subsequent case law,
virtually any state regulation of medical care relates to such plans,
i.e., has a "connection with" them. Had the Court, per Shaw and
its progeny, invalidated states' regulation of hospital fees as
relating to employer-provided medical plans, no principle would
have stopped preemption there. Rather, the invahdation of New
York's hospital surcharges would logically have been the first step
in dismantling the state law framework governing health care,
heavily financed via ERISA-regulated plans. Finding this an
District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992)
(quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,139 (1990)).
" Id. (quoting Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 139).
Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739).
" While the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit nominally placed
its primary reliance on Ingersoll-Rand, its analysis fits more comfortably with the facts and
reasoning of Metropolitan Life. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 719 (2d Cir.
1993) ("[T]he surctoges purposely interfere with the choices that ERISA plans make for
health care coverage. Such interference is sufficient to constitute 'connection with'
ERISA plans.").
100 por a discussion of reasons for this, see Theodore R. Marmor & Michael S. Barr,
Making Sense of the National Health Insurance Reform, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 228,
256 (1992) ("liiere is very little evidence that Americans prefer the employer-based
aspect of our present arrangements, rather than the tax-subsidy aspects of it.").
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unacceptable result, the Supreme Court abandoned the Shaw
framework, but in a fashion neither wholly candid nor wholly
convincing.
The Court bottomed its Travelers analysis upon the
observation that preemption doctrine has traditionally begun with
the "presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state
law."'"' Moreover, if the critical phrase of section 514(a)—"relate
to"—"were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its
indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would
never run its course, for '[r]eally, universally, relations stop
nowhere."""^
Had there been no Shaw line of cases, both of these
pronouncements might have been unexceptionable; given the
existence of Shaw and its progeny, both of these pronouncements
are problematic: in the Shaw cases, the Court never deployed the
traditional presumption against preemption at the first stage of the
analysis, in determining whether a state law relates to ERISA
plans for purposes of section 514(a). That presumption, when it
enters the Shaw jurisprudence, enters only at the second stage, in
applying the special exemptions for state banking, securities,
insurance, and criminal laws. Moreover, the capacious Shaw
test—if it does not extend to the furthest stretches of
indeterminacy—comes fairly close, i.e., to the hard-to-define
territory where state laws are too "remote," "tenuous,"
"peripheral," or "run-of-the-mill" to be preempted.'"^ It is,
furthermore, difficult, as a textual matter, to view section 514 as a
mere restatement of the Court's implied preemption doctrine with
its predisposition against preemption.'""
Declaring the precise text of section 514(a) "unhelpful,"'"^ the
Travelers Court turned its attention to the legislative purpose of
ERISA preemption: "to avoid a multiplicity of [state] regulation in
order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee
benefit plans.'""" Reviewing Shaw, EMC, and Ingersoll-Rand, the
Travelers Court found that the state laws at issue in these cases
"mandated employee benefit structures or their administration'""^
or provided "alternate enforcement mechanisms'""" and thus
101 New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995).
102 Id. at 655 (alteration in original)(citation omitted).
101 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
10^ See discussion jupro notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
101 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 646.
100 Id.
102 Id. at 658.
108 Id.
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frustrated the policy of national uniformity. In contrast, the New
York hospital surcharges merely have an "indirect economic effect
on choices made by insurance buyers, including ERISA plans,"^*®
making commercial insurance and self-funding less attractive than
Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage; hence, no ERISA preemption.
To buttress its conclusion sustaining New York's hospital
surcharges, the Travelers Court noted that, if state laws are
preempted because of their "indirect economic influence""" on
ERISA plans, there is virtually no limit to the reach of such
preemption. For example, states' "basic regulation of employment
conditions will invariably affect the cost and price of [hospital]
services.""^ However, the Court continued, it is unlikely that
Congress intended for ERISA preemption to reach this far and
thus "displace general health care regulation, which historically
has been a matter of local concern.""^
Washington Board of Trade had recently and contrariwise
reaffirmed that section 514(a) preempts laws affecting ERISA
plans indirectly; indeed, the statute struck in Washington Board of
Trade as ERISA-preempted regulated an area which "historically
has been a matter of local concern""^—workers' compensation. In
apparent recognition of this difficulty, the Travelers Court then
took a final stab at its new standard for ERISA preemption:
indirect effects will result in preemption if such effects are
"acute.""'' New York's surcharges, however, do not fall within this
category since "they affect only indirectly the relative prices of
insurance policies, a result no different from myriad state laws in
areas traditionally subject to local regulation, which Congress
could not possibly have intended to eliminate.'""
Of course, reasonable people can disagree whether a twentyfour percent (24%) cumulative surcharge for commerciallyinsured patients creates an "acute" effect. It is, however, beyond
peradventure that the resulting test for ERISA preemption—
whether a challenged state law creates an indirect, but acute,
economic effect—cannot be found in Shaw or its progeny.
Confronted with the unpalatable results to which Shaw was
pointing—the progressive dismanthng of state regulation of
medical care as preempted by ERISA—it is understandable that
the Travelers Court reconsidered the Shaw framework. However,
Id. at 646.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 661.
Id.
Id. at 668.
"5 Id.

"0
"1
"2
"3

832

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:807

for three reasons, Travelers is not a persuasive reading of section
514. First, if, as Travelers indicates, section 514(a) merely
embodies the Court's traditional standards of implied preemption,
why did Congress bother enacting section 514? The Court's
preemption doctrine is well-established"® part of the legal
environment against which Congress enacted ERISA in 1974; had
there been no section 514, the Court's normal implied preemption
standards would, by default, have governed ERISA; there is no
apparent reason why those who drafted section 514 would have
felt compelled to restate prevailing preemption doctrine
statutorily.
Second, Travelers ignores the difficult textual problem
presented by section 514's exemptions for state banking, securities,
insurance, and criminal laws. If, as Travelers indicates, section
514(a) incorporates a presumption against preemption, it is hard to
see that from which these laws are exempted. Indeed, if section
514(a) merely declares the Court's regular preemption doctrine
with a predisposition against preemption, the four protected
categories are, from a textual perspective, most plausibly read as
removing state banking, securities, insurance, and criminal laws
from standard preemption analysis, thereby relegating such laws to
lower than normal levels of preemption scrutiny. Under this
approach, section 514 becomes an anti-preemption provision—a
result which is, at the least, counterintuitive.
Finally, Travelers is internally inconsistent, proclaiming a
presumption against preemption in ERISA cases while
simultaneously preserving the Shaw-hased case law incompatible
with that presumption.
One reading of Travelers is that, as to state laws affecting
benefits, administration, and remedies, something akin to the
Shaw approach continues, notwithstanding Travelers's proclaimed
embrace of a presumption against preemption for ERISA
purposes. Under this construction of Travelers, one tier of state
laws—those which do not impact upon benefits, administration,
and remedies—will be subject to traditional, deferential
preemption analysis while state laws affecting benefits,
administration, and remedies will be subject to 5/iaw-type
treatment—^near automatic preemption."^
The Coxurt's preemption doctrine is not without its own difficulties. However, that
doctrine is part of the legal environment against which Congress adopted ERISA. See,
e.g., Grey, supra note 41.
Ill Professors Mashaw and Marmor are skeptical of the extent to which Travelers
changed the law of ERISA preemption. Their skepticism appears to be premised upon an
understanding of Travelers similar to that discussed in the text. See Jerry L. Mashaw &
Theodore R. Marmor, Federalism and Health Care: A Reply, 28 CONN. L. REV. 161, 165
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There is, however, no warrant in the terminology of section
514(a) (ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any" ERISA-covered plan)
for a two-tier approach which treats some state laws differently
than others."® Moreover, Travelers suggests no rationale for such
differential treatment other than that state laws affecting plan
administration, benefits, and remedies were previously litigated
under the capacious Shaw approach and found preempted under
that approach. Ultimately, this approach, by subjecting some state
laws to heightened preemption scrutiny, cannot be reconciled with
the Travelers Court's simultaneous declaration of a presumption
against preemption.
An alternative reading of Travelers is that its presumption
against preemption applies across-the-board but that, when
ERISA regulates, it does so in such detail that the presumption
will generally be overcome. This reading is plausible as to state
laws affecting plan administration and remedies, areas where
ERISA provides sufficiently elaborate regulation that, even with a
supposition against preemption, ERISA will generally preempt.
However, this approach fails to explain why, per Travelers,
state laws affecting the substance of welfare plans are preempted.
The absence of substantive federal regulation of welfare plans,
when combined with the traditional presmnption against
preemption, indicates that there is no preemption of state laws
affecting the content of welfare plans since there is no affirmative
federal regulation occupying the relevant field. Travelers'^
embrace of traditional preemption analysis contradicts Travelers'^
simultaneous assertion that state laws affecting plan benefit
structures are generally preempted since, under the traditional
analysis, the lack of federal regulation, coupled with the
predisposition against preemption, implies that the states are free
to fill the regulatory void as to welfare plans.
A sympathetic observer (and I am one) could explain
Travelers'^ unsatisfactory disposition of the cases decided under
Shaw as reflecting the Court balance of conflicting needs. On the
one hand, the Court, for the normal reasons, e.g., reliance
interests, judicial self-discipline, desired to maintain its precedent
intact, precedent which, under Shaw, struck broadly at state laws
affecting benefits, plan administration, and remedies. On the
(1995); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 812, 820 (8th Cir.
1998) ("[W]e do not read Travelers to reject all of its prior precedent on the scope of
ERISA preemption or as a wholesale rejection of the mode of analysis employed in the
Court's prior precedent.").
"8 ERISA § 514(a), 88 Stat. 829,897 (1974).
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other hand, the Court, with equal plausibility, needed to reform its
understanding of ERISA preemption given the unpalatable
implications of the Shaw line of cases which threatened to nullify
basic state regulation of health care; the Court's chosen instrument
for such reform was the traditional presumption against
preemption.
But Travelers, by deploying the traditional presumption
against preemption, undercut the logic of the Shaw-based
precedent, precedent which the Court wanted to preserve, but
which is based on the contrary premise of near-automatic
preemption. Travelers avoids this dilemma by ignoring it,
preserving the Shaw-based case law by little more than judicial
fiat. As I discuss later,"' a more forthright recognition by the
Court that it has altered its understanding of section 514(a) could
provide a more persuasive basis for preserving much (though not
all) of its prior case law while avoiding the pitfalls of the overlyexpansive Shaw approach.
To summarize: the capacious Shaw test, applied to New
York's hospital surcharge scheme, would preempt that scheme as
relating to employers' ERISA-regulated medical plans and would,
by extension, undermine most (perhaps all) of the states'
regulation of medical care since such care is heavily financed by
ERISA-governed arrangements; the limits to preemption
developed under the Shaw approach ("remote," "tenuous,"
"peripheral," "run-of-the-mill")"" do not convincingly save New
York's hospital surcharges from preemption; quite reasonably, the
Travelers Court did not want to invalidate as ERISA-preempted
New York's surcharges; it was thus necessary to reformulate the
Court's Shaw-based jurisprudence of ERISA preemption;
consequently, the Court introduced into the first step of section
514 analysis the traditional presumption against preemption.
However, deploying that presumption eroded the premise of the
Court's Shaw-based case law, case law bottomed on an expansive
understanding of the statutory "relate to" test; nevertheless, the
Travelers Court persisted in seeing no contradiction between its
preservation of the Shaw line of cases and the Court's
simultaneous repudiation of the expansive reading of section
514(a) upon which that line is based. The upshot is the internally
inconsistent opinion in Travelers.
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc.,^^^ dispels any possibility that
See infra Part IV.B.
1^0 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
121 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
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Travelers is aberrational. Dillingham makes clear both that there
will be no return to Shaw and that the Court is reluctant to admit
that this is so.
California law allows a contractor to pay lower than prevailing
wages to apprentices working on public construction projects, but
only if California has approved the apprenticeship program.
Separately-funded apprenticeship programs are ERISA-covered
welfare plans.^^^ California's prevailing wage statute and its
exception for approved apprenticeship programs do not fall within
any of the statutory categories protected from section 514(a), viz.,
state banking, insurance, securities, or criminal laws. Under Shaw
and its progeny, the California prevailing wage statute relates to
ERISA plans by permitting lower than prevailing wages on public
construction projects for apprentices in approved apprenticeship
arrangements; hence, under the Shaw formula, the statute is
preempted.
While paying nominal obeisance to Shaw, the Dillingham
Court made clear that the contrary principles of Travelers govern:
preemption analysis begins with the presumption that Congress
intends federal and state law to coexist unless Congress "clear[ly]
and manifest[ly]"^^'' indicates an intent to preempt; a state law with
an "indirect economic influence"^^^ on an ERISA-covered plan
does not "relate to" such plan for purposes of section 514(a); if
ERISA were to preempt state laws regulating health care, "we
could scarcely see the end of ERISA's pre-emptive reach;"
ERISA preemption is generally limited to state laws impinging
upon plan administration and the design of plan benefits.
From these Travelers-hosed premises, Dillingham upholds the
California statute restricting lower wage payments on public
construction projects to apprentices in state-approved programs;
"apprenticeship standards and the wages paid on state public
works have long been regulated by the States."^" These standards
and wages are "quite remote"^^® from concerns about plan
122 See ERISA § 3(1), 88 Stat. 829, 833 (1974). Apprenticeship programs financed from
employers' general revenues are not ERISA-covered plans.
123 Insofar as California's statute is authorized by the federal statute governing
apprenticeship programs, ERISA section 514(d) might preserve the California law as an
extension of federal law. See id. § 514(d), at 897. However, since the Court held that the
California statute does not "relate to" ERISA plans under section 514(a), it was
unnecessary for the Court to consider the implications of section 514(d).
12'* New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645,655 (1995) (citations omitted).
125 Id. at 659.
126 Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 329.
122 Id. at 330.
128 Id.
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administration and the design of plan benefits; it would be
"unsettling"^^' for ERISA to preempt in areas of traditional state
regulation, particularly as ERISA itself supplies no regulation in
these fields; the controlling presumption is that Congress did not
intend to preempt California law concerning apprenticeship
programs and wages at public works sites.
The critical (albeit unstated) premise of Dillingham is that
California's prevailing wage statute, insofar as it applies to
apprentices on public construction projects, does not regulate the
substantive content of apprenticeship programs, but merely
establishes a reduced minimum wage, conditioned upon the
apprenticeship program satisfying statutory standards. Given the
premise that the California law does not substantively regulate the
terms of apprenticeship programs,"" Dillingham logically flows
from Travelers and Travelers'^ more restrictive approach to
ERISA preemption utilizing the presumption against preemption.
The unpersuasive aspect of Dillingham is the Court's
insistence that there is continuity between Shaw and Travelers.
The problem is revealed most clearly in the Dillingham Court's
concluding observation "that California's prevailing wage laws and
apprenticeship standards do not have a 'connection with,' and
therefore do not 'relate to,' ERISA plans.""^ This attempt to
associate Dillingham with Shaw fails on its face: per Shaw and its
progeny, the California law restricting reduced wage payments on
public works to those participating in approved apprenticeship
programs is literally connected with such programs.
Concurring in the Dillingham result. Justice Scalia, along with
Justice Ginsburg, called for more forthright acknowledgment that
the Court has abandoned its prior understanding of ERISA
preemption: the "illusory test""^ of the statutory "relate to"
standard was "doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone
philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything
else.""^ Justice Scalia would relegate section 514(a) to tautological
status, a declaration that ERISA preempts only as to ERISA
plans, but not as to anything else.
Id. (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 665).
The contrary (and not implausible) characterization is that California's prevailing
wage statute regulates the substance of apprenticeship programs by restricting lower than
prevailing wages to apprentices participating in approved programs.
Under this
characterization, per Travelers the California law is ERISA-preempted as the substantive
regulation of the content of an ERISA program.
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 334 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 335 (Scalia, J., concurring).
"3 Id. The Travelers Court had cited Henry James for this proposition. Thus, the
Court seems to have covered all of its philosophical bases. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655.
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Justice Scalia is right to suggest that Travelers and Dillingham
depart significantly from the Court's prior Shaw-bsLsed
jurisprudence of ERISA preemption and to call for greater candor
in acknowledging the break between Shaw and Travelers}^
However, Justice Scalia's proposed construction of section 514 is
ultimately unpersuasive: as noted previously,"' it is, as a textual
matter, unconvincing to construe section 514(a) as a redundant
statement of normal preemption doctrine, i.e., that ERISA
preempts only as to ERISA plans. Such a construction is
particularly difficult to square with section 514's exceptions for
state banking, securities, insurance, and criminal laws, exceptions
which imply that section 514(a) embodies greater than usual
preemption scrutiny from which such laws are exempted.
Significantly, Justice Scalia traces the Court's "new approach
to ERISA pre-emption," not to Travelers, but to the Court's
earlier decision in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Harris Trust and Savings Bank.^^^ Justice Scalia cites John
Hancock for the proposition that ERISA does not "alter
traditional pre-emption analysis.""' However, in making that
observation, the John Hancock Court referred not to section
514(a) and the first stage of ERISA preemption analysis, but to
section 514's protection for state insurance laws and the second
stage of analysis, applying that protected category."® John
Hancock held that state banking, insurance, securities, and
criminal laws are not immunized from all preemption scrutiny, but
remain subject to the Court's traditional preemption doctrine.
However, that conclusion is only sensible if section 514(a), from
which these state laws are exempt, embodies a more stringent than
normal approach to preemption.
Thus, Justice Scalia's Dillingham concurrence properly
defines the problem—the need to acknowledge the break between
the Court's old and new approach to ERISA preemption—but
does not provide a convincing reading of the text of section 514.
The third of the Court's new preemption cases, De Buono v.
NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund,™ was authored by
Justice Stevens. If it overstates to say that in De Buono Justice
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
See discussion inpra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
"6 Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 336 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting John Hancock, 510 U.S. at 89).
"8 5ee John Hancock, 510 U.S. at 99. Technically, John Hancock only construes
ERISA's insurance exemption.
Logically, John Hancock's approach, i.e., regular
preemption standards for state laws protected from ERISA preemption, applies as well to
state banking, securities, and criminal laws.
13' 520 U.S. 806 (1997).
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Stevens's FMC dissent"" became the majority view, it does not
overstate by much. De Buono involved a New York state tax
levied on the gross receipts of hospitals and similar facilities. The
trustees of an ERISA-covered welfare plan objected to the tax as
it applies to a medical clinic operated by their plan; the trustees
claimed that section 514 preempts the tax.
Rejecting the trustees' claim, the De Buono Court upheld the
New York tax on hospitals' gross receipts, relying on Travelers and
Dillingham and the principles they embody: "a strictly literal
reading of § 514(a)
is impossible since, taken literally, the
statute's "relate to" standard has no boundaries; there is a
presumption against preemption, particularly the preemption of
"the historic police powers of the State includ[ing] the regulation
of matters of health and safety.""^ The New York gross receipts
tax neither proscribes nor mandates particular benefits for
employer-provided plans. In short, the New York tax is one of
many laws of "general applicability" which, despite its impact on
the facilities operated by an ERISA plan, is not ERISApreempted."^
As an application of the Court's normal implied preemption
analysis, it is hard to fault De Buono. However, De Buono again
ignores the textual problem of interpreting section 514(a) as a
statement of the Court's regular implied preemption doctrine:
Why would the drafters of section 514 have felt compelled to
restate statutorily the Court's standard implied preemption
doctrine?
If section 514(a) merely embodies traditional
preemption analysis, what do we make of the statutory exceptions
for state banking, securities, insurance, and criminal laws?
One way of characterizing the problem is that the Court has
framed its choices under section 514 as either near automatic
preemption without discernible limits (i.e., Shaw and its progeny)
or the Court's normal preemption doctrine (i.e.. Travelers and its
progeny) with more stringent treatment for state laws pertaining to
benefit structures, plan administration, and remedies. The former
approach leads to unpalatable results, preempting more broadly
than the Court (and many observers, including me) thinks is
proper; the latter approach disrespects the text of section 514,
which is most convincingly read as commanding more than the
Court's standard doctrine of implied preemption. The Travelers
formula also preserves the Court's preexisting case law without
1''® See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,65 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"1 De Buono. 520 U.S. at 813.
Id. at 814.
Id. at 815.

ERISA PREEMPTION

1999]

839

confronting the inconsistency between that case law and the
simultaneous assertion of a presiimption against preemption.
The question thus becomes whether section 514 can be
construed more workably to embody a middle way, i.e., more
exacting than usual preemption scrutiny, but still scrutiny with
reasonable limits. In the next section, I propose such an
understanding of section 514 and ERISA preemption.
IV.

CONSTRUING SECTION 514: A REASONED
TEXTUALIST APPROACH

A. Outlining the Approach
In this section, I advance an alternative approach to ERISA
preemption, an approach which can best be described as
"reasoned textualism." This approach is textualist as it respects
the statute—rather than judicial policy predilections or extratextual legislative intent—as the primary source of law;^"" this
approach is reasoned in that—in contrast to the mechanical
textualism justly deprecated by the critics of Shaw—this approach
seeks to make section 514 workable by considering the rest of
ERISA, the legal environment in which section 514 was adopted
(namely, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of implied
preemption), and the practical implications of the manner in which
section 514 is understood.
As to state laws impinging upon areas where ERISA
legislates, e.g., the administration of employee benefit plans, the
fiduciary standards governing such plans, the substantive rules for
pension plans, this approach utilizes the normal implied
preemption questions—Has Congress occupied the field? Does
state law conflict with federal law?—and thus mandates
examination of particular provisions of the statute to determine if
such conflict or occupation exists. However, to give content to
section 514(a) and its "relate to" standard, the usual presumption
protecting state law is reversed and preemption the rebuttably
presumed outcome. Section 514(a) thus serves as a statutory
canon of construction that, for preemption purposes, the
provisions of ERISA be understood more, rather than less,
broadly and consequently carry greater than usual preemptive
force vis-a-vis state law; reasonably close cases are to be resolved
in favor of preemption.
Thus, the reasoned textualist approach contrasts with the analysis of those
commentators who dismiss the statute as hopelessly unhelpful and call on judges to mold
their own preemption jurisprudence for ERISA.
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When state laws affect the substance of welfare arrangements,
the standard implied preemption inquiry—Is there federal law
which conflicts or occupies the field?—sustains such state laws
since ERISA itself lacks substantive guidelines with which state
law conflicts. However, my approach deems this conclusion
incompatible with section 514 and its command for more than
standard preemption doctrine.
Accordingly, the reasoned
textualist approach construes section 514 as forbidding state
regulation of the content of welfare plans even though there is no
federal law which conflicts or occupies the field. In this context,
section 514(a) establishes a zone of employer autonomy as to the
content of welfare plans; ERISA's silence as to that content is not
an invitation for the states to intrude but, per section 514(a), a
directive to stay out also.
For these purposes, the zone of employer autonomy is defined
by reference to ERISA's substantive regulation of pensions:^'*' if
ERISA affirmatively regulates a particular facet of pension plans
(e.g., the employees who must be covered by such plans), the
combination of section 514 and ERISA's silence on that subject as
to welfare plans consigns that subject to employer autonomy.
Thus, as to a state law impacting upon the substance of welfare
plans, the Court should ask whether such law intrudes upon the
zone of employer autonomy defined by reference to ERISA's
regulation of pension plans. If the challenged state law intrudes
upon the zone of employer autonomy so defined, the law is
ERISA-preempted and the zone thereby preserved from state as
well as federal regulation.
Finally, if either a pension or welfare plan is touched by a
state banking, securities, insurance, or criminal law, my approach
reads the statute's exemptions for these four categories of state
law as mandating regular implied preemption analysis with its
predisposition against preemption.
This understanding of the statute gives content to section
514(a), treating it both as a reversal of the normal presumption
against preemption and as a statutory statement of the zone of
employer autonomy as to the substance of welfare plans. This
construction of section 514 also preserves the textual integrity of
the exceptions for state banking, securities, insurance, and criminal
laws in the second step of the statutory analysis by ensuring that
there is indeed something from which to except such laws, namely,
section 514(a)'s presumption for preemption. This reading of
section 514(a) avoids the problem that "everything is related to
This methodology is developed further infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
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everything else"''*® by construing section 514(a) as a command to
expand preemption beyond traditional boundaries, by presuming
preemption and by respecting the zone of employer autonomy as
to the substance of welfare arrangements, but not as a charge to
push the "relates to" terminology to its furthest possible reaches.
Finally, this reading of section 514 abandons the problematic
distinctions under Travelers among effects which are "direct,"
"indirect," and "indirect but acute."
This approach to ERISA preemption is more workable and
better respects the statute than does the Travelers formula which,
by equating section 514 with the Court's traditional preemption
doctrine, leaves too many anomalies: Why did ERISA incorporate
conventional preemption analysis statutorily when, as a matter of
well-established case law, that analysis applied anyway? If section
514(a) merely incorporates traditional implied preemption
standards, what do we make of the statutory exemptions for state
securities, banking, insurance, and criminal laws? Why preserve
the results of the prc-Travelers case law when the fundamental
premise of Travelers—the traditional presumption against
preemption—undercuts that case law?
B. The Alternative Approach and the ShssN-Based Case Law
In this subsection, I apply my approach to the cases decided
by the Supreme Court under Shaw and conclude that, besides
better respecting the statute than does the Travelers framework,
this approach fits more comfortably with many of the Court's prior
decisions under section 514. When my formula produces different
outcomes than Shaw, the difference is for the better, yielding more
appropriate preemption outcomes.
Consider initially a situation where ERISA affirmatively
regulates. Consider, in particular, Ingersoll-Rand, in which the
Court struck as preempted an employee's state law cause of action
against his employer. ERISA section 510 provides, in the
employee plan context, a statement of employees' rights vis-a-vis
employers; section 502 provides remedies for enforcing those
rights; reading section 514(a) as a presumption for preemption, it
is more than plausible to construe ERISA sections 502 and 510
broadly, as occupying the field of employees' plan-related rights
and remedies against employers to the exclusion of state law
theories of recovery. Here, the Shaw rule of near automatic
preemption and the reasoned textualist approach produce the
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519
U.S. 316, 336 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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same outcome, i.e., the preemption of employees' state law
remedies against employers.
In contrast, if Ingersoll-Rand is analyzed with a presumption
against preemption, ERISA's remedies and state law remedies can
be harmonized with the latter viewed as supplementing the
former. From this perspective, more accommodating to state law,
the Ingersoll-Rand Court was wrong to declare that ERISA
preempts plan-based state law actions against employers since
these actions can be viewed as augmenting a base level of federal
remedies.
In implicit recognition of this (or similar) logic. Travelers
preserves Ingersoll-Rand by declaring in ipse dixit fashion that
(notwithstanding the newly-announced presumption against
ERISA preemption) state laws affecting plan remedies are still
preempted under Travelers. However, there is no rationale for
this declaration other than the Court's apparent desire to preserve
case law which, examined ab initio, is incompatible with the
Travelers predisposition against preemption.
Ingersoll-Rand thus highlights the internal inconsistency of
the Travelers framework which, on the one hand, proclaims a
presumption against preemption but which, on the other hand,
declares that the Shaw-hsLS&d case law remains in effect—even
though cases like Ingersoll-Rand should be decided differently
with a presumption against preemption, a presumption which
suggests that state law remedies supplement, rather than
challenge, federal law. In contrast, if section 514(a) is interpreted
as a rebuttal predisposition for preemption, Ingersoll-Rand is
correctly decided given the scope of rights and remedies
established by sections 502 and 510, sections which together
provide a reasonably comprehensive legal framework for
employer-employee relations in the context of ERISA plans and
which, viewed from a presumption for preemption, furnish an
exhaustive federal statement of employees' rights vis-a-vis
employers.
In reaching this conclusion under the reasoned textualist
approach, section 514(a) plays a critical role as (contra Travelers)
creating a presumption for preemption. Whether a field is
occupied by a particular statute or whether there is conflict
between different laws are not mechanical inquiries, but require
judgments heavily influenced by the predispositions brought to
them. Given a presumption that ERISA conflicts with state law or
displaces it, the import of ERISA will be defined more broadly,
heightening the possibility of conflict or displacement; conversely,
given a predisposition to uphold state law, the ambit of ERISA
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will be understood more restrictively, thus minimizing the
potential clash between ERISA and state law.
When state laws affect the substance of welfare plans, the
reasoned textualist approach first defines the zone of employer
autonomy by examining ERISA's regulation of pension plans and
by extrapolating from such regulation the subjects which, by
analogy, ERISA consigns to employer autonomy (rather than
regulating). This approach then determines if the challenged state
law impinges upon that ERISA-created zone of employer
autonomy. In this context also, the reasoned textualist vantage
more comfortably preserves the results of much of the 5/zaw-based
case law than does the Travelers framework.
Consider initially Shaw itself. If we apply the Travelers
presumption against preemption, Shaw, which struck New York's
statute mandating pregnancy-based disability benefits, was decided
wrongly: there is no irreconcilable conflict when New York
requires pregnancy-based disability benefits for employees, but
federal law does not. Federal law, given a predisposition against
preemption, can be viewed as a floor which establishes minimum
protections nationally, but which does not preclude supplemental
state regulation above that minimum; since federal law does not
occupy the field exclusively, states are free to augment the federal
floor if they want to add further rights for pregnant women.
Hence, looking at the facts of Shaw ab initio, the presumption
against preemption suggests that, contrary to the Court's actual
holding in Shaw, section 514 does not displace New York's more
demanding law requiring pregnancy-based disability payments, a
law which supplements basic federal protections.
To avoid this conclusion and preserve the ^XQ-Travelers case
law, the Travelers Court decreed that state laws affecting benefit
structures are preempted—^without explaining why this should be
so given a presumption against preemption. In effect, the
Travelers Court says that the result in Shaw—preemption of the
New York pregnancy disability law—will remain good law because
the Court wants it to remain good law, notwithstanding the
incompatibility between the Court's result in Shaw and the Court's
new jurisprudence of ERISA preemption which presumes against
the preemption found in Shaw.
A reasoned textualist analysis better comports with the
outcome in Shaw, the New York statute mandating pregnancy
disability benefits impinges upon the zone of employer autonomy
as to the substance of welfare plans and is consequently
preempted.
At first blush, section 514(a) seems to create a zone of

844

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:807

employer autonomy without defining the dimensions of that zone.
On a second look, however, the pension provisions of ERISA
provide guidance as to the contours of that zone by regulating
deferred compensation plans and thereby identifying the topics
which, were the statute to regulate the content of welfare plans,
would be the appropriate targets of such regulation. In effect,
ERISA's regulation of pension plans constitutes a blueprint for a
parallel scheme of shadow regulation for welfare arrangements
and thereby defines for such arrangements the areas which the
statute could have but does not govern, areas thus relegated to the
regime of employer determination.
Reading ERISA in this fashion, it regulates in detail pension
payments, prescribing the form"^ and the timing of such
payments.^''® A parallel scheme of welfare plan regulation would
similarly govern the form and timing of welfare benefit
distributions; that ERISA is silent on the subject of welfare plan
distributions (while it addresses in detail the topic of pension plan
distributions) indicates that the form and timing of welfare plan
payments are consigned to the zone of employer autonomy.
Hence, it is the employer's decision as to form and timing whether
or not welfare plan payments will take the form of pregnancy
benefits.
ERISA's specific approach to pension plan disability benefits
confirms that the provision vel non of such benefits by welfare
arrangements is committed to the employer's discretion. While
ERISA mandates the timing and form of many kinds of pension
benefit payments,^'" ERISA facilitates but does not require
pension distributions on disability.^'" A fortiori, if pension plans
(subject to detailed regulation of their distributions) can, in the
employer's discretion, provide disability payments or not, welfare
plans (free of all regulation of their distributions) can similarly
provide disability payments or not.
Thus, extrapolating from ERISA's approach to pension
distributions in general, and disability benefits in particular, the
zone of employer welfare plan autonomy extends to the
employer's decision to furnish or elect against disability payments
and to specify covered disabilities if such payments are furnished.
The New York law mandating pregnancy disability benefits
See ERISA § 205, 88 Stat. 829, 862 (1974); I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(ll), 417 (West 1999)
(dealing with spousal survivorship distributions).
See I.R.C. § 72(t) (dealing with penalties for early distributions); id. § 401(a)(9)
(dealing with required distributions at certain ages).
I'" See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(iii) (West 1999) (suspending a 10% penalty on earlier
distributions in case of employee disability).
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intrudes upon the zone of employer judgment by mandating that
welfare plans offer a specific form of disability benefit. Hence, the
New York law is ERISA-preempted.
The analysis of EMC under the reasoned textualist approach
is similar: in EMC, the employer's medical plan (an ERISAgoverned welfare arrangement) defined the participant's
substantive benefit as the participant's medical costs minus the
participant's reimbursement from other somces; Pennsylvania's
anti-subrogation statute, if applicable to welfare arrangements,
would increase the dollar amount of the medical plan's benefits by
forcing such plan to ignore the participant's indemnification from
other sources, thus requiring the plan to defray the participant's
gross (rather than net) medical expenses. While ERISA regulates
pension contributions and benefits in many respects, it permits
employers to set the amount of such contributions and benefits
within broad statutory limits;^^^ a fortiori, ERISA's zone of
employer autonomy frees employers to set the level of the welfare
benefits they provide.
Consequently, ERISA preempts
Pennsylvania's substantive regulation of medical plan benefit
levels via Pennsylvania's anti-subrogation statute.
A comparable analysis applies to the last of the Shaw line of
cases, Washington Board of Trade}^^
The D.C. workers'
compensation statute requiring health coverage for injured
employees regulates a topic which ERISA addresses in detail as to
pensions, but not welfare plans, i.e., coverage. Among ERISA's
most intricate provisions are those mandating which employees
must
participate
in
qualified
deferred
compensation
arrangements;^'^ in contrast, ERISA says nothing about the
coverage of medical plans and other welfare arrangements.
Reading section 514(a) in the context of ERISA's elaborate
coverage rules for pensions, the D.C. statute tells employers
something which ERISA reserves for the employer's own decision,
i.e., who is covered for health benefits.
Finally, in comparison with Travelers, the reasoned textualist
approach more satisfactorily preserves the result in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.As I have emphasized, a
See id. § 415. Among its other provisions, ERISA requires that benefits and
contributions be provided to rank-in-file participants on a nondiscriminatory basis.
ERISA also regulates minimum funding levels for pension plans to guarantee such plans'
ability to pay promised benefits. See id. §§ 40i(a)(4), 412. However, within these
boundaries, employers are free to determine the level of benefits or contributions their
respective plans will provide.
District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
See I.R.C. § 410 (West 1999); ERISA § 202,88 Stat. 829,853 (1974).
"t 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
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conundrum under the Travelers framework is what to do with the
statutory exemptions for state banking, insurance, securities, and
criminal laws if section 514(a) merely embodies the traditional
presumption against preemption.^" If, on the other hand, section
514(a) creates a predisposition for preemption, these exemptions
are most naturally read as restoring in the exempted areas the
traditional presumption against preemption.
Under that
presumption, the insurance law mandating mental health benefits
for policies sold within Massachusetts is compatible with ERISA,
as the Massachusetts statute merely controls the content of
insurance products which ERISA plans are then free to purchase
or not.^"
While the reasoned textualist approach better preserves much
of the Shaw case law than does Travelers, this approach does not
preserve all of that case law. In particular, my analysis indicates
that Mackey and Dedeaux were wrongly decided.
Turning first to Mackey, under my approach, whether or not
state garnishment laws apply to welfare plan benefits is a matter of
the employer's discretionary plan design; the employer can
structure welfare benefits with or without spendthrift protection.
Thus, neither the Mackey majority (which held that welfare plan
benefits are always garnishable) nor the Mackey minority (which
held that such benefits never are) got it right: it is the employer's
call.
From the reasoned textualist vantage, ERISA's silence as to
the spendthrift status of welfare plan benefits is most naturally
read as freeing employers to design such plans with (or without)
spendthrift clauses. While ERISA section 206(d)(1) commands
that pension benefits must be inalienable,"^ the absence of a
welfare plan counterpart to section 206(d)(1) places the issue of
benefit alienability in section 514(a)'s zone of employer discretion
over the content of welfare arrangements; employers can, but need
not, design their welfare arrangements with spendthrift clauses.
State garnishment statutes are consistent with employer autonomy
when employers reject spendthrift-protected welfare benefits,
thereby permitting state garnishment statutes to apply to such
benefits; in contrast, ERISA preempts state garnishment statutes
when employers define welfare benefits as protected from
See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
156 By the same token, the state regulation of insurance reserves, at issue in John
Hancock, is presumptively not preempted by ERISA.
15' Subject to certain exceptions such as qualified domestic relations orders. See
ERISA § 206(d)(3). This section was not included in the original 1974 ERISA legislation,
but was added under the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 99 Stat. 1426
(codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1994)).
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alienation.
The Mackey majority thus drew the wrong conclusion from
the fact ERISA mandates spendthrift protection for pension
benefits but not for welfare payments; ERISA's silence on the
inalienability vel non of welfare benefits does not mean that such
benefits are always garnishable, but that it is the employer's
substantive decision to provide welfare plans with spendthrift
protection or not. If an employer's welfare plan has a spendthrift
clause, that clause should be respected like the employer's other
decisions about plan content and state garnishment law
consequently kept at bay per section 514(a); similarly, if an
employer declines spendthrift protection for its welfare plan, that
is an equally valid decision about benefit design, subjecting plan
benefits to garnishment and other forms of alienation.^^®
Similarly, from the reasoned textual vantage, the rule of the
Mackey minority—welfare benefits are never garnishable—goes
too far in the opposite direction. If employers elect spendthrift
protection for welfare plan benefits, section 514(a) protects that
design and state garnishment laws are accordingly stayed as to
such benefits; if, on the other hand, employers reject spendthrift
protection for their welfare arrangements, that decision should
also be respected and state garnishment statutes applied as to
unprotected welfare benefits. In that case, employers' elections
against spendthrift protection overcome the presumption that state
garnishment laws are ERISA-preempted.
The reasoned textualist approach also indicates that the Court
decided Dedeaux wrongly. As I discuss below,^'® this conclusion is
particularly significant for the current controversies about ERISA,
managed care organizations, the state tort liability of such
organizations, and states' efforts to regulate such organizations.
In Dedeaux, the employee sued neither his plan nor his
employer, but rather a service provider, an insurer hired to process
claims for the plan and its participants. The distinction among
plans, employers, and service providers is central to the text of
ERISA^®" although the distinction was understandably ignored
The most obvious reason employers would reject spendthrift protection is that they
envision themselves as potential creditors of their employees; suppose, for example, an
employee defrauds the employer and the employer seeks a civil recovery; garnishable
welfare benefits may be the employer's best hope of recovery.
See discussion infra notes 178-93 and accompanying text.
160 Under ERISA's prohibited transactions rules, service providers must furnish their
services to ERISA plans for "reasonable compensation" and cannot otherwise engage in
financial transactions with such plans. See I.R.C. §§ 4975(c), 4975(d)(2), 4975(e)(2)(B)
(West 1999); ERISA §§ 3(14)(B), 406(a)(1), 408(b)(2), 88 Stat. 829, 834, 879, 883 (1974).
On the prohibited transactions rules generally, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Pensions and
Property Contributions: Wood, Keystone, and the Supreme Court, 56 TAX NOTES 651, 656-
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under the capacious Shaw test of near automatic preemption.
Under that test, Dedeaux's action against the insurer indeed had a
connection with the plan to which the insurer furnished services
and was thus logically found preempted.
If, however, we pull back from the Shaw standard and
reexamine ERISA section 502 afresh, a central feature of that
procedural provision is that it grants remedies against plans,
employers,^®^ and fiduciaries, but not against service providers such
as the insurer hired in Dedeaux. Moreover, as a substantive
matter, ERISA regulates in detail plans, employers, and fiduciaries
but not such service providers. Hence, examined as a whole,
ERISA can properly be viewed as a comprehensive scheme which,
given a presumption for preemption of state law, forecloses
participants' state law actions against the parties governed by
ERISA, i.e., plans, employers, and fiduciaries.
In contrast, ERISA acknowledges the existence of service
providers, but leaves them essentially untouched.^®^
While
ERISA's nonregulation of service providers might suggest that
service providers are, in their relationships with plans and
participants, free of legal restraints (since ERISA preempts state
law without providing any regulatory framework for service
providers), the more compelling inference is that service providers
and their relationships with plans and plan participants are
supervised by state law. Service providers mark the boundary
where ERISA ends and state law begins.
The inference that ERISA precludes the application of state
law to service providers proves too much, indeed, effectively
leaves service providers in a state of nature. Suppose, for example,
that a pension plan pays an actuary for professional services which
services the actuary does not perform; suppose further that the
plan sues the actuary for the return of the fee. Substantively, no
provision of ERISA requires professionals to perform the services
for which they are paid; procedurally, no provision of section 502
enables the plan to recover its payment since section 502 provides
no remedies against service providers. While we could conclude
that the plan is simply out of luck, I doubt that many would
embrace that conclusion.
To avoid the deduction that ERISA preempts state law
57 (1992); Edward A. Zelinsky, Property Contributions to Qualified Plans: The DOL
Threatens Established Tax Law, 62 TAX NOTES 753,754 (1994). Except for the provisions
of the prohibited transactions rules, ERISA does not regulate service providers.
For these purposes, the regulation of employers includes the regulation of the plan
administrators to whom employers may delegate their administrative obligations. See
ERISA § 3(16), at 835.
See supra note 160.
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remedies against the actuary, we might try, under Shaw, to
characterize such remedies as remote, tenuous, peripheral, or runof-the-mill to the plan and ERISA's legal framework. Ultimately,
however, those formulations are, at best, of little help, at worst, are
conclusory labels for desired results.
A more convincing reading of the statute is that service
providers remain within the sphere of state law as ERISA only
governs relations among plans, employers, participants, and
fiduciaries. Dedeaux consequently overcomes the presumption for
preemption by demonstrating that he is suing in state court only a
service provider; substantively and procedurally, his relationship
with that service provider falls outside the scope of ERISA and
comes within the sphere of state law.
It is, in short, a sensible reading of ERISA from the reasoned
textualist vantage to view the statute as a comprehensive (and
consequently exclusive) statement of the legal relationship among
plans, employers, participants, and fiduciaries. However, service
providers, acknowledged but unregulated by ERISA, stand just
outside the border of this regulatory scheme and remain within the
sphere of state law. Dedeaux should have been permitted to
proceed with his case.
C. Reasoned Textualism, Travelers, and Boggs
The reasoned textualist method not only better preserves
much of the Shaw-bsLS&d case law than does the Travelers
framework, but that method more convincingly justifies the results
in Travelers itself, i.e., the preservation of New York's scheme of
hospital surcharges.
A reasoned textualist approach to Travelers starts by defining
the employer's zone of autonomy by looking at ERISA's detailed
rules on substantive pension matters, e.g., the employees who must
participate in pension plans and when they must participate,^®^ the
requirement that plan benefits or contributions not discriminate
against rank-and-file employees,^®" the rates at which pension
benefits must accrue and vest,^®® certain mandatory features of plan
distributions.^®®
Notwithstanding this extensive regulation of pensions, state
law may also affect the ultimate level of a participant's pension
payout. If, for example, features of state corporation law enhance
See I.R.C. § 410 (West 1999); ERISA §§ 201,202, at 852,853.
16" See I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (West 1999).
166 See id. § 411; ERISA §§ 203,204, at 854, 858.
166 See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(ll), 401(a)(14), 401(a)(15), 417; ERISA §§ 205, 206(a)-(b), at
862, 864.
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(or depress) corporate share values, the quantum of plan assets
and, hence, plan benefits, will be affected by those features of state
law.^®^ Similarly, a state's minimum wage statute might reduce the
profits of a corporation operating in that state with attendant
impact on the value of the corporation's shares and, hence,
pension plan assets. Nevertheless, even with a presumption for
preemption, ERISA does not supersede such state laws under the
reasoned textualist vantage as ERISA neither occupies the fields
of corporate or minimum wage law nor is there any conflict
between the substantive pension provisions of ERISA and such
corporate and minimum wage laws.
Against this background and analogizing from it, section
514(a)'s zone of employer autonomy for welfare plans covers such
matters as who participates in such plans and when, and the
amount and scope of welfare plan benefits—areas which ERISA
regulates for pensions but which, per section 514(a), are consigned
to employer discretion in the welfare context. However, the
employers' sphere of autonomy does not extend to state laws
which (like corporate and minimum wage statutes) affect welfare
plans economically, but which do not touch on the subjects within
this protected sphere. Since, on a searching reading of ERISA,
state corporate and minimum wage statutes are consistent with
ERISA's regulation of pension plans, such statutes are consistent
with ERISA's nonregulation of welfare plans.
New York's hospital surcharge scheme is analogous to state
corporation and minimum wage laws in its effect on plans and in
its compatibility with the substantive provisions of ERISA.
Hence, New York can maintain its network of hospital surcharges
since these surcharges, while making commercial insurance and
self-funding more expensive than Blue Cross policies, do not
intrude upon the zone of employer autonomy as to the substance
of welfare arrangements (e.g., determining who participates in
such plans and how much in benefits they receive).
In contrast. Travelers sustains the New York hospital
surcharges by relying on two problematic notions. One of these—
state laws which affect ERISA plans indirectly, but "acutely"—is
particularly difficult to apply in cases like Travelers: while the
If the plan is a defined contribution arrangement, the impact of state law is direct, as
the participant's benefit is a function of the value of the assets in his individual account.
The impact of state law upon the employee is more subtle in a defined benefit context
since the employer is legally obligated to make good any shortfall between the benefits
promised by the plan and plan assets. On the other hand, fewer plan assets make it more
difficult to increase plan benefits. In the worst case scenario—plan insolvency—the
employee covered by a defined benefit plan would look to his employer and, if applicable,
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's insurance program.
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Court concluded otherwise, a twenty-four percent (24%) addition
to a Manhattan hospital bill will strike many as acute in its effect.
The second troubling notion in Travelers—the distinction
between those state laws enjoying a presumption against
preemption and other laws generally preempted—finds no basis in
the statute which, on its face, commands a single preemption
standard for "any and all state laws."^®^ It is, moreover, hard to
reconcile Travelers's proclamation of a class of state laws generally
preempted by ERISA (laws affecting plan administration, benefits,
and remedies) with Travelers's simultaneous (and inconsistent)
embrace of a presumption against preemption.
Similar observations can be made about De Buono and the
New York State tax levied on hospitals' gross receipts, suggesting,
again, that the reasoned textualist approach more persuasively
justifies the Court's results under Travelers than does Travelers
itself. The tax at issue in De Buono does not regulate the
substance of welfare plans, e.g., who participates in such plans,
what benefits such plans offer. Rather, the New York tax on
hospital receipts is just that, a levy on hospitals, not a regulation of
welfare plan content. Insofar as the tax is absorbed by the
hospitals themselves, the tax decreases the hospitals' value and,
thus, the net worth of the welfare plans which in De Buono owned
such hospitals. However, that tax does not intrude upon the
ERISA-established zone of employer autonomy any more than do
state corporation and minimum wage laws which can similarly
affect the value of plan assets.^®'
168 ERISA § 514(a), at 897.
16' In the third of the Travelers cases, Dillingham, the Court's critical move is to treat
the California prevailing wage statute as a minimum wage law, rather than as a regulation
of the substance of apprenticeship programs. Under the Travelers framework, state laws
affecting "benefit structures" are subject to more rigorous preemption scrutiny; in
summarily rejecting that alternative, the Dillingham Court instead applied the
presumption against preemption to the California statute, thus deciding that the statute is
properly characterized as regulating wages rather than plan content. See California Div.
of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316 (1997). Using
the same assumption under my approach, the result is the same as the Court's: viewing the
California statute as regulating wages rather than the content of apprenticeship programs,
that statute falls outside the zone of employer autonomy and is thus not preempted.
If, on the other hand, Dillingham is approached with a totally clean slate, my
analysis and conclusion would be different: examined ab initio, the California statute
strikes me as regulating the content of apprenticeship plans analogously to ERISA's
attempt to constrain the substance of pension plans through the nondiscrimination rules;
just as the nondiscrimination rules are designed to increase the pension benefits and
contributions of rank-and-file participants by linking their pension levels to those of
management, the California statute affects the substance of apprenticeship programs by
linking contractors' ability to pay lower wages on public contracts to the satisfaction of
California standards for apprenticeship programs. Under this characterization, the
California statute intrudes upon the zone of employer autonomy as a regulation of the
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Perhaps the best evidence of the superiority of the reasoned
textualist approach is the Court's decision in Boggs v. Boggs™ to
ignore Travelers, indeed to ignore section 514 altogether; had the
Court applied Travelers in Boggs,
would have gone the
other way.
Factually, Boggs presented a fairly typical situation: Isaac
Boggs, a widower, remarried toward the end of his working life; he
died four years into retirement; his children from Isaac's first
marriage claimed an interest in his pension; Isaac s second wife,
Sandra (now his widow), resisted, claiming the entire pension for
herself.^"'^
Two aspects of the Boggs situation set the stage for a
showdown in the United States Supreme Court. First, the Boggs
family lived in Louisiana, a community property state. Second,
Dorothy Boggs, Isaac's first wife, had, when she died, left an
interest in her estate to her children with Isaac."^ Hence, under
Louisiana's community property laws, Isaac s children from his
first marriage had a strong claim, via their mother, to part of
Isaac's pension: as community property, one-half of Isaac's
pension was Dorothy's; Dorothy provided that her assets were to
go to her children on Isaac's death; with Isaac gone, the children
were entitled to the interest in Isaac's pension which had belonged
to their mother and had been left to them by her.
However, Sandra, supported by the Solicitor General,
convinced a bare majority of the Court that ERISA s provisions
mandating spousal survivor benefits^" and spendthrift protection""
preempt Louisiana's community property law."' From this
vantage, ERISA creates for the surviving widow (Sandra) an
substance of welfare plans, i.e., the terms of apprenticeship programs; given the
presumption of preemption, the statute is preempted.
-c • •
Similarly, under the Travelers framework, the California statute is preempted if it is
characterized as a regulation of plan content (rather than a minimum wage law) since,
under Travelers, state laws affecting benefit structures are subject to greater preemption
scrutiny, rather than the presumption against preemption. Thus, under either framework,
mine or Travelers'^, the California statute is ERISA-preempted if characterized as
regulating the substance of apprenticeship programs; under my approach, the statute, so
characterized, intrudes on the zone of employer autonomy as to welfare plan content;
under Travelers, the statute, so characterized, is subjected to the more stringent standard
for preemption applying to laws affecting plan benefit structures.
1™ 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
171 See id. at 836-37.
.
.
177 In particular, Dorothy left her offspring a remainder interest in two-thirds ot
Dorothy's assets, such remainder interest to take effect upon Isaac's subsequent death.
See id.
173 See I.R.C. §§ 401(a), 417 (West 1999); ERISA § 205, at 862.
17" See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13); ERISA § 206(d), at 864-65.
173 See Boggs, 520 U.S. at 853.
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overriding federal entitlement to the deceased participant's
pension, an entitlement which state law cannot nullify or offset.
Under the Travelers framework (ignored by the Boggs Court),
this conclusion is wrong. Starting with the Travelers presumption
against preemption, ERISA's spousal annuity and spendthrift
provisions can be harmonized with Louisiana community property
law, leaving the state law intact. As Justice Breyer noted in his
Boggs dissent,^^® Isaac's pension could, per federal law, be payable
to Sandra as his surviving widow while Louisiana, as a matter of
local property law, could award other assets of Isaac's estate to his
children to compensate them for the pension interest which, under
community property law, is theirs but which, under ERISA, is
payable to their father's widow."^
In contrast, the reasoned textualist approach justifies the
majority outcome in Boggs under the rubric of section 514, i.e.,
Sandra receives Isaac's pension free of the children's community
property claims and of the need for any compensating offset to the
children from the rest of Isaac's assets. Starting with a
presumption for preemption per section 514, the import of
ERISA's spousal protection provisions can be understood more
(rather than less) broadly, as conferring upon Isaac's widow an
entitlement to his pension under a federal form of community
property law which the state cannot offset through the allocation
of other items in Isaac's estate. Under the reasoned textualist
approach, section 514 is not (as it was for the Boggs majority) a
problem to be ignored, but rather, construed as a presumption for
preemption, is a more convincing explanation for the majority's
conclusion.
Boggs is a close case—as witnessed by the Court's 5-4 split—
but those are the cases where a presumption makes a difference.
The Boggs majority reached its result only by disregarding the
Travelers presumption against preemption and by ignoring section
514. In contrast, the reasoned textualist approach, which adds to
Sandra's side the weight of a statutory predisposition for
preemption, justifies the Boggs outcome and its more expansive
understanding of ERISA's spousal.protection provisions as a form
of superseding federal community property law in plan benefits
which the states are forbidden to nullify or offset.

1'* See id. at 855 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Moreover, Boggs does not fali within any of the categories Travelers designates for
more exacting ERISA preemption scrutiny, i.e., state laws affecting plan benefit
structures, plan administration, and remedies.
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D. HMO Tort Liability and the Regulation of Managed Care
The issues which have recently made ERISA preemption a
politically contentious matter are the issues of tort liability in the
managed care context and the state regulation of managed care
organizations.
In the tort setting, much popular and scholarly attention has
focused upon the processes by which managed care arrangements
prescreen proposed medical procedures and the cases in which
such managed care utilization review processes arguably
miscarry."® The typical case involves an employee covered by his
employer's medical plan whose physician prescribes a particular
course of treatment; rmder the employer's plan, this prescribed
regimen is reviewed by an entity hired for that purpose, an
insurance company or other managed care firm to which the
employer has contracted the administration of the plan. The
reported cases invariably entail tragic circumstances, e.g., a cancer
patient denied treatment who later dies."' If the denial of
treatment was wrongful and caused the patient's injury, the inquiry
then becomes what, if any, remedies are available.^®"
ERISA section 502, in these cases, provides only for
"recover[y of] benefits due" under the plan.^®^ While in many
instances the recovery of previously-denied benefits constitutes
full and fair compensation (e.g., the restoration of a pension
participant's disallowed retirement payments), in a managed care
utilization review case, it is often too late for the restoration of
plan benefits to constitute a meaningful recovery; the employee, as
a result of the deprivation of medical care, has frequently suffered
medically irreversible harm, indeed has often died. What, then,
about possible remedies under state law tort theories?
Dedeaux, as decided per the Shaw test of near automatic
preemption, counsels that ERISA preempts any state law remedy
See, e.g.. Amy F. Khen, Comment, Are We Protected from HMO Negligence? An
Examination of Ohio Law, ERISA Preemption, and Legislative Initiatives, 30 AKRON L.
REV. 501 (1997).
™ See, e.g., Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that ERISA
preempts claims based upon denial of therapy to participant who died from brain tumor);
Benoit v. W.W. Granger, Inc., 22 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2034 (E.D. La. 1998)
(holding that ERISA preempts claims based upon denial of immediate surgery to accident
victim).
180 Note that, in the managed care context, the conclusion that treatment is unnecessary
or unauthorized denies such treatment since prior approval is required for treatment to
proceed. In contrast, under fee-for-service medicine and traditional medical insurance,
the insurer's disapproval comes after the service has been performed. Hence, in the
traditional setting, the consequence of disapproval is not denial of treatment, but denial of
payment.
181 ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 88 Stat. 829, 891 (1974).
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against an insurer or other company performing utilization review
for the employer's managed care plan. Such a remedy, imder
Shaw and Dedeaux, has a connection with an ERISA-covered
arrangement, i.e., the employer's medical plan for which the
review was done; hence, no state law cause of action lies for faulty
decisions made in the utilization review process.
The reasoned textualist approach, in contrast, indicates that,
under a more searching reading of the statute, ERISA does not
preempt state law remedies when a plan participant sues a service
provider (since service providers fall outside the ambit of section
502) and that Dedeaux was thus wrongly decided (since Dedeaux's
lawsuit against the insurer was aimed at a service provider rather
than the plan or the employer).^®^ In the utilization review context,
the critical difference between the ShawlDedeaux approach of
near automatic preemptions®^ and the reasoned textualist approach
is that the former focuses upon the nature of the injured plaintiff's
claim (Does such claim have a connection with an ERISA plan?),
while the latter focuses upon the identity of the defendant. When
employees sue service providers (as opposed to plans, employers,
and fiduciaries) under state tort theories, I conclude, ERISA does
not preempt (even with the presumption for preemption) since, as
a textual matter, no provision of ERISA regulates the relationship
between employees and service providers. There is, in this
context, no conflict between state tort remedies and ERISA nor
does ERISA occupy the field since ERISA section 502 says
nothing about service providers.
What if the employer's plan performs utilization review inhouse rather than contraeting that function to an outside service
provider?^®'' Under the reasoned textualist approach, ERISA
preempts state tort law remedies against plans since section 502,
given a presumption for preemption, provides the exclusive set of
remedies vis-a-vis such plans. Under this analysis, a dichotomy
emerges between plans which perform utilization review functions
internally (not liable under state law for mistakes because ERISA
182 See discussion of Dedeaux under the reasoned textualist approach, supra notes 15962 and accompanying text.
18' Insofar as Travelers indicates that greater preemption continues for state laws
affecting plan participants' remedies, Travelers points in the same direction as Shaw and
Dedeaux, i.e., the ERISA preemption of state tort law.
i®"! An aggressive reading of the statute might embrace a "dual function" analysis: while
the plan as such cannot be sued under a state law theory because plans are covered
comprehensively by ERISA section 502, the plan, when it steps into the role of being its
own service provider, is, in that latter capacity, liable imder state law since service
providers fall outside the ambit of section 502. On balance, however, I think this approach
pushes the text of the statute too far, bliuring unacceptably the statutory distinction
between service providers and the plans they service.
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sections 502 and 514 preempt state law remedies vis-a-vis plans)
and plans which contract for managed care services (the outside
service provider being subject to state law theories of recovery
since service providers, unlike plans themselves, fall outside the
scope of section 502). To those who would object to this
distinction, the short answer is that it is found in the statute—
which distinguishes between plans and service providers—and that
Congress can change the statute if it desires.
The longer answer is that Congress, when it passed ERISA in
1974, could not have foreseen the way medicine in general, and
employer-provided medicine in particular, would be organized in
1999. Conceivably (but by no means invariably). Congress would
have fashioned parts of ERISA differently had it been able to
divine the configuration of medicine a generation later.
The issue now is what institution of government, if any,
should revise today the policies embodied in ERISA. In
respecting the terms of the statute, including the distinction
between plans, which are covered by section 502, and service
providers, which are not, textualism, as is frequently the case,
becomes a statement of institutional competence. I will address
this issue more generally in a moment.^^^ For now, I would simply
observe that Congress and the Executive branch are well aware of
ERISA preemption;^®® there is simply no political consensus to
amend the statute.^®'
My analysis of state laws regulating managed care entities is

185 See discussion infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
186 See, e.g., S. 1890,105th Cong. § 302 (1998); H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 302 (1998); S.
1499,105th Cong. § 202(b) (1997); H.R. 2967,105th Cong. § 202(b) (1997).
i^i In the text, I explore the issue of state tort liability for utilization review decisions
since these decisions have received much scholarly and judicial attention. However, my
analysis applies to more traditional malpractice claims as well. Suppose, for example, that
an employee covered by his employer's medical plan requires surgery and that the
surgeon, engaged pinsuant to a managed care arrangement, commits malpractice. Shaw
and Dedeaux indicate that the employee has no state tort law claim against the surgeon
(since he rendered medical care in connection with the employer's medical plan) and that
the employee has no ERISA-based claim, either (since section 502 does not authorize
malpractice actions).
To avoid this conclusion, the courts might label the employee's state law malpractice
claim as having only a "remote," "tenuous," or "peripheral" link to the plan, or as the kind
of "run-of-the-mill" state law actions ERISA does not preempt. However, as I have
suggested, these labels are at best conclusory, at worst misleading.
The reasoned textualist approaeh, in contrast, indicates that ERISA does not
preempt whatever state law remedies the employee might possess against the physician
and the managed care organization since these service providers fall outside the coverage
of section 502. On the other hand, section 502, as a comprehensive statement of remedies
against employers and plans, preempts the employee's state law claims against his
employer and its plan.
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similar. Such legislation takes many forms/®** including states'
substantive mandates that providers furnish particular services to
their patients, procedural requirements for utilization review
decisions, and "any willing provider" statutes which require
managed care organizations to pay any medical provider (e.g., any
doctor) for furnished services as long as such provider meets the
organizations' terms and conditions.*®'
Under Shaw and Massachusetts Life, ERISA preempts this
kind of regulatory legislation when it applies to managed care
entities hired by employers' medical plans. Such legislation is
indistinguishable from the Massachusetts insurance statute
deemed to "relate to" ERISA plans by constricting employers'
choices: just as the Massachusetts statute denied employers the
option of insuring their medical plans without paying for mental
health benefits, state laws regulating managed care organizations
preclude employers from contracting with such organizations
unless the employers accept the full panoply of state-mandated
rules imposed upon such organizations. While the Massachusetts
statute was ultimately saved from preemption by section 514's
insurance exemption, no such exemption protects from ERISA
preemption state laws regulating managed care entities.
In contrast, under the reasoned textualist approach,*'" state
statutes governing managed care organizations, notwithstanding
the presumption for preemption, are compatible with ERISA
because such statutes do not intrude upon the zone of employer
autonomy defined by reference to ERISA's regulation of
pensions,*'* a zone extending and limited to such topics as who is
covered for welfare plan benefits and the amounts and forms of
such benefits. State statutes regulating managed care entities
constrict the choices of service providers, but do not require plans
or employers to use such service providers.
In this setting, we again see the divergence under the
reasoned textualist approach between service providers (subject to
state regulation since ERISA does not govern such providers) and
plans furnishing their own services in-house (immune from state
See, e.g., Ellen Perlman, Taming the Managed Care Beast, GOVERNING, May 1998,
at 28.
1*' Compare Washington Physicians Serv. Ass'n v. Gregoire, 147 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding Washington's Alternative Provider Statute is not ERISA-preempted), with
Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding
Arkansas's Patient Protection Act, including its "Any Willing Provider" provision, is
ERISA-preempted).
1'° The same is also true under Travelers: state laws regulating managed care entities
are similar to the New York hospital surcharges upheld in Travelers.
See discussion supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
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regulation since ERISA preempts state laws intruding upon plans'
zone of autonomy). And, again, the appropriate response to this
divergence is that it is embodied in the statute and can be changed
by Congress if the political will exists.
Finally, consider the proposed preemption provisions of the
Dingell-Norwood legislation, passed by the House of
Representatives as this Article goes to publication.
The
conventional understanding of Dingell-Norwood is that, if enacted
into law, it would restrict the reach of ERISA preemption and
would correspondingly broaden the tort liabilities of HMOs and
other managed care organizations. If Shaw and Dedeaux remain
good law, the Dingell-Norwood provisions, if incorporated into
section 514, would indeed expand the liabilities of managed care
entities.
On the other hand, under the reasoned textualist approach to
section 514 and ERISA preemption, the Dingell-Norwood
provisions are largely superfluous since, from the reasoned
textualist vantage, memaged care organizations, as service
providers outside ERISA's regulatory scheme, are already subject
to state law tort obligations. Indeed, under the reasoned textualist
construction of section 514, Dingell-Norwood, if enacted into law,
would actually reduce the state law tort liabilities of health care
providers by imposing upon plaintiffs a general requirement that
they exhaust their administrative remedies,^" a requirement which
some (perhaps many, maybe all) states, left to their own devices,
would not impose.
V.

REASONED TEXTUALISM AND ERISA
PREEMPnoN IN CONTEXT
In this section, I place my discussion of ERISA preemption in
several contexts. By doing so, I hope to confirm the case for the
reasoned textualist approach to ERISA preemption. I also hope
that my analysis of ERISA preemption, besides benefiting from
the insights to be derived in these settings, will contribute some
insight as well.
A. Implied Versus Express Preemption
The courts and commentators typically think of preemption in
dichotomous terms, as either express or implied: when a federal
statute contains an explicit statement about that statute's
preemptive effect, the courts' task is the implementation of that
192 Indeed, I argue for such change infra Part V.E.
193 See H.R. 2990,106th Cong. § 1302(a) (1999) (adding to ERISA section 514(f)(3)).
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statement; when a federal statute lacks an express provision
delineating the statute's preemptive scope, the preemption inquiry
determines whether, by implication, the statute conflicts with state
law or so occupies the field as to preclude simultaneous state
regulation.
As a declaration of broad principles, these are useful
generalizations. The saga of ERISA preemption, however,
indicates the limits of these generalizations. ERISA preemption is
best understood as a hybrid, partaking of both express and implied
preemption. Section 514 is obviously an explicit statutory
statement on the subject of ERISA's preemptive effect; just as
obviously, the critical terminology of section 514 ("relate to"),
standing alone, is enigmatic. The reasoned textualist insight is that
the terminology of section 514 can be made workable if it is read in
three contexts; the rest of ERISA, the conventions of implied
preemption doctrine (i.e., field and conflict preemption), and a
standard implement from the lawyer's toolkit (i.e., presumption).
What emerges—section 514(a) as a presumption that
provisions of ERISA conflict with state law or occupy the field so
as to exclude state law—does not fit comfortably in either the
preemption box labeled "express" or the box labeled "implied."
However, such a reading of section 514 gives meaning to the text
as a statement to preempt more expansively than normally while
avoiding the troubling territory where section 514 becomes the
Godzilla of preemption, crushing everything in its path.
Consider, again, in this context Dedeaux and Boggs. In
Dedeaux, the Court, after examining section 514(a), placed it aside
to examine independently the implied preemptive effect of section
502; in Boggs, the Court ignored section 514(a) altogether. From a
textualist perspective, both of these cases are troubling: section 514
is in the statute. It is one thing to resort to implied preemption
when a statute is silent as to its preemptive effect; it is another to
use implied preemption doctrine as a means of ignoring a difficult,
but express, preemption provision.
On the other hand, section 514(a) as an express preemption
statute is, as the Court has repeatedly noted, not a model of
draftsmanship.
The only way to reconcile the conflicting
imperatives—to give eontent to the text of section 514(a) while
reaching reasonable results—is to breach the dichotomy between
express and implied preemption, to read section 514(a) as a
statutory command to presume preemption by reading broadly the
import of ERISA's other provisions and, with that presumption, to
ask the standard questions of implied preemption doctrine, i.e.,
whether ERISA conflicts with the challenged state law or occupies
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the field to the exclusion of state law. In short, despite its value in
other settings, in the context of section 514, a sharp distinction
between express and implied preemption proves unhelpful since
only by taking elements from both categories can section 514 be
respected as statutory text while producing reasonable outcomes.
B. Path Dependency
I suspect that the Court might have arrived at this or a similar
analysis had the ERISA preemption cases come before the Court
in a different order than they did. Thus, a second lesson of the
saga of ERISA preemption is that legal doctrine can indeed be
path dependent.""
In an important sense, the Court's expansive reading of
section 514 in Shaw and Massachusetts Life made no practical
difference in those cases. Federal law had, for years subsequent to
those at issue in Shaw, banned discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy; consequently, in striking New York's law protecting
pregnant employees, the Court was denying such protection only
for years which had already passed, not for the future when the
new federal statute applies. Similarly, in Massachusetts Life, the
Court's expansive reading of section 514(a)'s "relate to"
terminology made no ultimate difference since, at the second stage
of the section 514 inquiry, the Massachusetts law survived as an
exempted insurance regulation. In these cases, the practical
implications of the Shaw standard looked, if not benign, at least
manageable.
Then, by the time of Dedeaux, Shaw and
Massachusetts Life had committed the Court to an expansive
reading of section 514 even though the implications in Dedeaux
were more troubling, i.e., denying Mr. Dedeaux his remedy.
It is interesting to speculate as to the Court's course had
Dedeaux come first. Perhaps Dedeaux would then have been the
occasion for articulating initially the expansive understanding of
section 514's "relate to" terminology actually announced in Shaw,
in this case, the Court's interpretation of ERISA preemption as
nearly automatic would have unfolded as it in fact did. On the
other hand, it is possible that Dedeaux, decided before there was a
Shaw, might have given the Court greater pause and led to a
narrower formulation of the reach of ERISA preemption.
To stretch the hypotheticals further, suppose that Travelers
had been the first ERISA preemption case to reach the Court. It
is, again, possible that, approaching ERISA preemption afresh, the
i'" On path dependency, see Charles M. Yablon, Judicial Drag: An Essay on Wigs,
Robes and Legal Change, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1129.
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Court would have formulated in this hypothetical Travelers case
the same expansive reading of section 514 embraced in Shaw. But
it is also possible that, confronted with the facts of Travelers
instead of the facts of Shaw, the Court would have declined to
strike New York's hospital surcharge scheme—as indeed the
Court later did. The result would have been ab initio a more
restrained reading of ERISA's preemptive scope.
C. Varieties of Textualism
The story of ERISA preemption also highlights the variety of
approaches which, in current legal parlance, are labeled as
"textualist."^''
The mechanical, dictionary-based textualism
underlying Shaw has been widely condemned by commentators,
and deservedly so; confronted with a statute as enigmatic as
section 514, a court will not find viable guidance in Webster's; a
dictionary is not a substitute for judgment or for the searching
reading of a difficult text.
It is, however, equally troubling to respond to a trying statute
by abandoning it. As is clear from the voluminous contemporary
literature on the subject,^'® when difficult statutes are ignored,
important values are ignored with them, most notably, respect for
the legislative process and for politically accountable
decisionmaking."^
What I have labeled "reasoned" textualism is thus an attitude
which, in the face of a statute like ERISA, defines the judicial task
as giving a workable construction to the statute, as opposed to
declaring the statute hopeless and imposing the judiciary's own
policy preferences. The resulting engagement with the statutory
text will consider, inter alia, the practical effects of different
possible interpretations. However, the hallmark of this approach
is the recognition that, in a world of myriad policy choices, the
judicial decisionmaker should defer to the choice which emerges
It is an understatement to say that the scholarly literature on textualism has become
voluminous. See John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax
Code, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1501 (1997); Edward A. Zelinsky, Text, Purpose, Capacity and
Albertson's; A Response to Professor Geier, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 717 (1996); see, e.g., A
Symposium on Legal and Political Hermeneutics, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1883 (1995).
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Branch, The Federal Common Law of ERISA, 21 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 541, 563-69 (1998).

1''' Note that disregard of an enigmatic text like section 514 does not flout another
textualist value, i.e., predictability. When courts spurn reasonably clear statutory
language, the statute ceases to be a reliable guide as to what the law is, making the law less
predictable since the statute and the case law point in different directions. However,
difficult texts like section 514, by their nature, do not provide readily discernible guidance
to the reader; thus, ignoring such texts does not reduce the predictability of the law—even
though ignoring such texts reflects diminished respect for the legislative process.
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from the effort to make the statute workable.
An increasingly common critique is that judges who claim to
be textualists are sub silentio imposing their own policy
preferences in the guise of deference to statutory terminology;
when push comes to shove, it is argued, these putative textualists
pursue their personal policy predilections rather than the
discipline of text-based judging.^'®
At one level, we should not be surprised that judges have
conflicting values and that a judge who can, with equanimity, defer
to legislative policies in many (perhaps most) instances will, in
other settings, feel so strongly about a particular outcome that his
commitment to textualism is placed aside. Judges are human. At
another level, the charge that a particular judge uses textualism (or
any other method) inconsistently is, in the final analysis, a critique
of the judge, not the method.
However, the story of ERISA preemption suggests that the
approach today called textualism is more compelling for some
texts than for others; consequently, a judge could, in principled
fashion, define his task in the ERISA setting as making the statute
workable, deferring to the policies which emerge from a searching
reading of the statute, while, in other contexts, viewing the
relevant text as less constraining.
ERISA (like the Internal Revenue Code^") is the kind of
statute which presents a strong case for reasoned textualism:
intricate, technical, frequently revisited by Congress. Whether one
conceives of ERISA as a complex balance of technical and policy
considerations, the complicated accommodation of conflicting
interests, or a combination of the two,^°° Congress is the
appropriate forum for any adjustments or changes. But one size
need not fit all. That a judge properly defines his task in an
ERISA case as finding a sensible and coherent reading of this
detailed and textually complex statute tells us nothing about the
appropriate approach to the Equal Protection Clause.
D. The Illusiveness of Legislative Intent
Perhaps the strongest argument for the values underlying
what we today call textualism is the frequent insistence of its
1'* The frequently cited exemplar of the judge who consistently placed aside his
personal policy preferences is Benjamin N. Cardozo.
See generally ANDREW L.
KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998). It is interesting to speculate about the linkage between
contemporary interest in Justice Cardozo and current interest in textualism.
Indeed, much of ERISA is part of the Internal Revenue Code. See supra note 11.
200 My
assessment is that it makes the most sense to view ERISA as combining
complicated policy decisions with equally complex accommodations of varied interest
groups.

1999]

ERISA PREEMPTION

863

opponents that, in cases like ERISA preemption, they advocate,
not judicial displacement of legislative pronouncements, but a
purer implementation of legislative intent. In disregarding
statutory text, it is argued, the judge is not usurping the legislative
function, but is implementing the underlying legislative program.
Whatever its merit in other settings,^"^ in the context of
ERISA, statements of legislative intent are typically so general as
to be useless, e.g., ERISA was intended to help employees. As I
hope is clear to the reader,^"^ ERISA is a complex and, in many
respects, contradictory statute. It regulates some aspects of
employee plans in excruciating detail;^"^ it leaves other aspects
totally untouched.^'^ Many provisions of ERISA evince a
profound paternalism;^"' others reflect the assumption that a
properly informed employee can fend for himself;^"® yet other
provisions of ERISA appear to be concessions to employer
interests
While I do not doubt the sincerity of those who discern in all
of this an overriding legislative intent, I confess my skepticism. I
do, however, find it significant that these commentators often feel
compelled to justify their disregard of statutory text by resort to
notions of legislative intent. In one sense, we are all textualists or,
perhaps more accurately, we all accept—at least nominally—the
norms
(deference
to
politically-accountable,
legislative
decisionmaking) underlying textualism.
E. The Case for Repealing Section 514
My analysis suggests a final question: Should section 514
remain on the books? I conclude that it should not; Congress
should repeal section 514 and let the default rule—the Court's
normal jurisprudence of implied preemption—determine the
scope of ERISA preemption.^"®
2°! And I am a skeptic. See Zelinsky, supra note 195.
2"^ See Branch, supra note 196, at 547 ("The policy choices Congress made in creating
[ERISA]... reflect a complex balancing of competing interests.").
For example, ERISA's elaborate regulation of vesting. See I.R.C. § 411(a) (West
1999); ERISA § 203,88 Stat. 829,854 (1974).
Such as the employer's decision to provide pension disability benefits vel non. See
infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
Most obviously, ERISA's coverage rules require employers to include eligible
employees within qualified plans—whether or not the employees want to be covered. See
I.R.C. § 410; ERISA § 202, at 853.
20^ Important provisions of ERISA assure employees access to information on the
apparent assumption that, once informed, employees can protect their own interests. See
ERISA §§ 101-107, at 840-50; id. § 502(c), at 891-92.
2°^ Most obviously, the level of benefits promised by a pension plan is largely within the
employer's determination—as indeed is the decision whether to have a plan at all.
In contrast, others conclude that section 514 should be amended. See, e.g., Robert
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As a substantive matter, this conclusion reflects my
disenchantment with the policies most naturally read in section
514: a presumption for preemption, a zone of employer autonomy
as to the content of welfare plans
Procedurally, my conclusion
that Congress should repeal section 514 reflects the relative
institutional competence of Congress and the courts.
ERISA is both a detail resolution of myriad technical issues
and a complex balancing of contending interests. Only Congress,
supported by professional staff and acting through specialized
committees, can pronounce the kind of rules necessary to address
these issues and balance these interests. In contrast, preemption is
a matter of interstitial adjustment once substantive policy has been
formulated legislatively, involving the kind of case-by-case
determinations best consigned to the courts.
As long as Congress has allocated to itself primary
responsibility for ERISA preemption policy, the courts should
define their role as making that policy as workable as possible.
Congress would, however, be well-advised to delegate to the
courts a larger role by abolishing section 514 and thereby letting
the judiciary, case-by-case, resolve the compatibility of particular
provisions of ERISA and particular state laws.
The repeal of section 514—and the consequent resolution of
ERISA preemption cases under the Court's normal standards—
would make a practical difference in two kinds of controversies:
close cases and cases involving the substance of welfare plans.
As to the former, let us return one last time to Boggs. Either
of the possible characterizations of the relationship between
ERISA and Louisiana's community property law is plausible:
ERISA can reasonably be understood as awarding the surviving
spouse the pension death benefit as such, but as also permitting
the state to make an offsetting reduction of the community
property to which the spouse would otherwise be entitled.
Alternatively, as the narrow Boggs majority held, ERISA can be
construed as bestowing upon the surviving spouse an interest in
the deceased mate's pension which cannot be counterbalanced by
the state's allocation of the rest of the estate.
While the Boggs Court ignored section 514(a), the most
Covington, Amending ERISA's Preemption Scheme, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1
Julie K. Locke, The ERISA Amendment: A Prescription to Sue MCOs for
Wrongful Treatment Decisions, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1027 (1999); Julie K. Freeman,
Comment, ERISA Preemption of Medical Malpractice Claims Against Managed Care
Organizations, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 863, 885 (1998) ("The most expeditious and lucid remedy
would be for Congress to amend ERISA to clearly provide that the medical malpractice of
managed care organizations will not be shielded by ERISA.").
See discussion supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
N.

(1999);
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workable construction of that provision in a situation like Boggs is
as tie-breaker, a canon of construction presuming preemption and
thus indicating that close cases should be resolved in favor of
preemption. On that understanding of the statute, section 514's
repeal would place ERISA under the rubric of the Court s
traditional implied preemption doctrine which presumes against
preemption. On that alternative understanding, the Boggs
minority position, upholding Louisiana's community property law,
would become the law.
As to welfare plans, the repeal of section 514 would permit
the states to regulate the substance of such plans. Under all of the
possible understandings of section 514—Shaw, Travelers, reasoned
textualism^i"—section 514 precludes the states from regulating the
content of welfare arrangements; repeal of section 514 would
invite such state regulation since there is no federal legislation
which occupies the field or which would conflict with state statutes.
In practical terms, upon the repeal of section 514, the states could
pursue vis-a-vis employer-provided health plans the gamut of
possible policies, ranging from employer autonomy to extensive
forms of public regulation.
The case for repealing section 514 thus ultimately becomes
the argument for state experimentation and variation. Since
others have articulated this case so well,^" I limit myself here to
three observations. First, while the cumulative nature of pension
entitlements justifies national pension standards in a world of
employee mobility, the more discrete, annual character of welfare
plan benefits (in particular, medical arrangements) makes such
benefits more amenable to state-by-state regulation. Second, the
repeal of section 514 would have little impact in those areas where
ERISA affirmatively regulates since ERISA, when it does
regulate, generally does so exhaustively and thus preemptively.
Third, the case for abolishing section 514 is reinforced by the
increasingly problematic nature of the distinction between insured
and self-insured plans.
Pension interests are by their nature cumulative over an
employee's career; an employee sent by his employer from State A
to State B takes his pension entitlement with him; were States A
and B to promulgate conflicting regulatory schemes as to that
21° Shaw displaces state laws affecting the substance of welfare plans by virtue of Shaw's
capacious test of near automatic preemption. Travelers preempts state laws touching upon
the content of welfare arrangements because Travelers says it does. The reasoned
textualist approach preempts state laws impacting upon the substance of welfare plans by
reading section 514(a) as declaring a zone of employer autonomy as to such substance.
2" See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 117.
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continuing entitlement, the two schemes would need to be
reconciled, a task which would not always be easy.
Assume, for example, that, in a world where states regulate
pension vesting. State A vests all pension benefits after three years
of employment. State B vests after ten years, and an employee
moves from Ato B after four years of employment. The employee
in this example was vested in State A having met that state's three
year requirement. Is he still vested when the employee relocates
to State B with a longer vesting period he has yet to satisfy?
One can imagine several possible rules to resolve the conflict
between State A's more liberal vesting standard and State 5's
more stringent criterion, e.g., the employee remains vested as to
benefits earned in State A, but is not yet vested as to benefits
subsequently accrued in State B\ the employee becomes nonvested
as to all his benefits upon his move to State B with its longer
vesting requirements; having earned nonfeitable benefits in State
A under its more rapid vesting schedule, the employee is allowed
to use that vesting schedule now that he resides in B, even as to
benefits earned in B. This plethora of possibilities and the
likelihood (perhaps inevitability) that the various states will adopt
conflicting approaches suggests the desirability of a single,
nationwide vesting standard—as indeed ERISA provides.
Consider, in contrast, medical benefits and the annual, rather
than cumulative, nature of such benefits. Suppose, for example,
that State A mandates that employer plans must provide
psychological counseling services but that State B does not. If his
employer provides only the legally-required minimum in each
state, our hypothetical employee loses prospectively his
entitlement to such psychological services when he relocates from
A io B where such services are not part of the local minimum.
However, there is no retrospective implication to that loss of
coverage; no one would suggest that the employee must repay the
amounts for counseling he received while covered by State A's
mandate; State R's rule would just affect the employee going
forward, denying him future counseling services as a new resident
of State B.
In short, the employee's relocation from State A to State B is
far simpler as to medical benefits, which can more easily be
governed by different states' rules on a year-by-year basis, than as
to pension interests which, because of their cumulative nature,
raise more difficult problems about retroactive effects and
conflicting legal regimes.
Second, the repeal of section 514 would have minimal impact
in those fields where ERISA affirmatively regulates since ERISA,
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when it does regulate, usually^^^ does so exhaustively and thus
preemptively. Hence, as to many provisions of ERISA, the repeal
of section 514 would not matter as these provisions are so
extensive that, even with the Court's traditional presumption
against implied preemption, state law would conflict or be
squeezed out of an occupied field. If, for example, section 514
were repealed and a state enacted its own vesting requirements for
pensions, ERISA's detailed vesting provisions would preempt such
state requirements—even if there were no section 514 and the
matter were decided under the Court's normal implied preemption
standards.
Third, the case for repealing section 514 is reinforced by the
increasingly problematic nature of the distinction between insured
and self-insured plans, an important (but increasingly unworkable)
feature of section 514 which, via its insurance exemption,
postulates a reasonably clear boundary between insured and
noninsured arrangements. Consider, for example, the emergence
of "stop-loss" policies under which the employer is responsible for
its employees' medical expenses to a specified threshold with the
insurer liable for amounts in excess of the threshold. Presumably,
a state, as a permissible regulation of insurance, can specify
features of the stop-loss contract issued by the insurer to the plan.
Can such regulation affect the self-funded features of the plan?
Can, for example, a state, to insure the solvency of carriers issuing
stop-loss policies, limit the purchase of such policies to plans with
prescribed cost controls as to benefits below the stop-loss
threshold? If so, the state's regulation of insurance effectively
extends to the self-funded features of plans purchasing stop-loss
insurance, in practice blurring the distinction between the state's
jurisdiction over insurance and its nominal lack of authority over
the noninsured features of welfare plans. If, on the other hand, a
state cannot regulate the facets of the employer-funded portion of
the arrangement likely to cause employers to trigger the stop-loss
coverage, the state's regulation of insurance is severely limited as
to the traditional function of mandating carrier solvency
Either way, section 514's distinction between state insurance
laws, exempted from more stringent preemption standards, and
the noninsured aspects of welfare plans, immune from state
212 But not always. Thus, for example, I argued earlier that, given a presumption
against preemption, section 502, ERISA's remedy provision, can be viewed as a floor of
basic protections which the states can supplement. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
212 See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 712, 723 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that ERISA preempts New York Department of Insurance Actuarial Information Letter
No. 5 pertaining to stop-loss policies).
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insurance regulation and thus subject to more exacting preemption
scrutiny, proves in 1999 to be far more problematic than it was in
1974.
Or consider the now-common practice by which insurers set
premiums for particular employers based on the employer's own
claims experience in the preceding year. At one level, policies
issued in this fashion look like traditional insurance since the
insurer assumes the risk that the quoted premium (based on the
prior year's outlays) will cover claims for the current year. On the
other hand, in this context, there is, for the long run, no pooling of
risk between different employers; over time, each employer is in
effect its own risk pool with its premiums set to cover its outlays.
In an important sense, the employer in this setting is self-funding
over time since its premiums reflect its own anticipated experience
based on the employer's own past experience.
Formalistically, it is sensible to view policies issued in this
fashion as insurance subject to state regulation as such. However,
as a matter of substance, the employer can, with minimal economic
impact,^^" avoid that regulation by declaring that it will henceforth
self-insure with the carrier hired as plan administrator of the new
self-insured plan.
This suggests, again, that section 514's
distinction between insurance and non-insurance regulation is
today too permeable to be useful.
My conclusion that Congress should repeal section 514 stands
even if the Court embraces the reasoned textualist approach I
recommend; that approach is the best means of making section 514
workable; however, the limitations of even that approach suggest
the rescission of section 514 as the ultimate course in this area.
This conclusion is prompted, in particular, by my reading of
ERISA as permitting state tort actions against service providers
hired by plans, but not against plans themselves.^^' That reading is
a faithful construction of the text and a significant improvement
over the ciurent jurisprudence of ERISA preemption which, per
Dedeaux and Shaw, precludes all tort actions against plans and
providers alike.
21" In the short run, this impact would occur in a year when the employer's workforce
claimed unpredictably large medical benefits. A self-insured employer would (absent stop
loss coverage) be responsible for all of such benefits; under a "traditional" insurance
policy, with premiums reflecting the employer's prior experience, the unexpected benefit
obligation for the current year would instead be the insurer's responsibility. In the long
run, however, the employer would absorb the costs of these unanticipated benefits even
under "traditional" arrangements since the employer's premium for future years will be
increased to reflect the previously unpredicted (but now known) level of benefits for its
workforce.
215 See discussion supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
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However, the statute's distinction between service providers
(subject to state law liability for their mistakes) and plans which
perform all functions in-house (not subject to state tort law
because such plans are covered exclusively by ERISA section 502)
lacks, as a matter of policy, any compelling justification in the era
of managed care. Moreover, the distinction creates an artificial
incentive for plans to provide services in-house to avoid the cost of
tort liability even when third parties can furnish such services
better and/or more efficiently.^^® Hence, my conclusion that
section 514 and its policy of broader than normal preemption
should be repealed, thus allowing the states to supplement the
remedies of section 502, in particular, tort remedies against plans.
This conclusion does not assume that our current tort system
is, in theory or practice, a model of jurisprudence. It merely
postulates that, whatever the rules of tort liability are to be, there
is no reason today for distinguishing, as the text of ERISA does,
between service providers and plans.
Critics of the current tort system are tempted to embrace
section 514 as an ad hoc, albeit accidental, tort reform as section
514 and its expansive preemption of state law blocks application of
state tort rules in the context of employer plans. For a critic of
those rules, this is not an insignificant victory. Moreover, the
political pressure of those with economic interests in limiting tort
liability has been decisive in resisting—so far—legislative efforts to
modify the substance of ERISA preemption doctrine.
However, for the long run, the statute's distinction between
plans and service providers is no longer viable intellectually or in
practice. As a matter of theory, there is no reason in the era of
managed care why third party service providers hired by employer
plans should be subject to state tort liability while plans
performing the same functions in-house are not. Moreover, this
reading of the statute, while textually compelling, will, for the long
run, lead plans to shift functions from contract service providers to
in-house personnel to avoid the costs of tort liability—even
though, in many cases, outside service providers may be more
efficient than in-house personnel.
All of this suggests that, if the tort system should be modified,
that modification should occur directly, not through the backdoor
of ERISA preemption.
I also disagree with those who would amend, rather than
repeal, section 514."^ In general, those who would modify section
21® Presumably, the fees charged by third party service providers will reflect their state
law tort liability, liability which is eliminated by providing services in-house.
2" See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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514 would carve an exemption from ERISA preemption for state
tort law similar to the existing exemptions for state securities,
banking, insurance, and criminal laws.
My disagreement with such amendment is that it would not go
far enough. The underlying problem is not the impact of ERISA
preemption in the area of tort liability, but rather the impropriety
of the basic policy reflected in section 514, i.e., the greater than
normal scope of ERISA preemption.
The most compelling construction of section 514 is that it
creates a presumption for preemption and a zone of employer
autonomy as to the substance of welfare plans. While the courts'
role is to implement that statutory command, the Congress's role is
to assess whether, a generation after ERISA's initial adoption, that
command makes sense today. Since I answer that inquiry in the
negative, I view the amendment of section 514 as a palliative; at its
most basic, there is no reason for special preemption rules in the
ERISA context and, hence, no reason for retaining section 514.
CONCLUSION
In several senses, ERISA is a difficult statute. Much of
ERISA is technical and dense, a veritable "statutory thicket"^'®
through which even experienced experts often have trouble
making their way. Section 514 is difficult in a different sense, a
provision which understandably tempts the reader towards a
mechanistic textualism, but which, read in this fashion, leads to
consequences most observers would consider unacceptable. It is
by no means obvious how section 514 ought thus be understood.
Neither the Shaw approach, an exemplar of dictionary-based
textualism, nor the Travelers formula are ultimately satisfactory
formulations of ERISA preemption. The interpretative strategy
best labeled reasoned textualism is not without its own drawbacks.
It is, however, the most workable construction of section 514 and
ERISA preemption. The alternative—to effectively disregard the
statute—is unacceptable whether such disregard is framed as the
implementation of some higher legislative intent or as a candid
recognition that the text is being discarded.
Ultimately, the integrity of a system of statutory law depends
upon taking statutes seriously.
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